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RANDOM JUSTICE*
GIRARDEAU A. SPANN**
As recent Senate confirmation practices suggest, the Supreme Court is best
understood as the head of a political branch of government, whose Justices are
chosen in a process that makes their ideological views dispositive. Throughout
the nation’s history, the Supreme Court has exercised its governing political
ideology in ways that sacrifice the interests of nonwhites in order to advance the
interests of Whites. In the present moment of heightened cultural sensitivity to
structural discrimination and implicit bias, it would make sense to use
affirmative action to help remedy the racially disparate distribution of societal
resources that has been produced by a long history of covert discrimination. But
the Supreme Court has held that such efforts to promote racial balance are
patently unconstitutional, because the Constitution recognizes only intentional
discrimination, and not racially disparate impact, as a form of inequality that
can be addressed through affirmative action. However, there is a way in which
efforts to both promote racial balance and remedy disparate impact would be
permissible, even under the racial jurisprudence of the new six-to-three
conservative Supreme Court. Affirmative action plans that used randomized
lotteries to allocate resources, such as university admissions, among qualified
applicants would constitute race neutral ways of approximating the allocation of
resources that would exist in a truly nondiscriminatory culture. By using
statistical randomness as a safeguard against structural discrimination and
implicit bias, U.S. culture might be able to secure a level of racial justice that it
has been unable to achieve through its antidiscrimination laws. The only
significant cost of such lottery-based admissions would be the potential loss of
some prestige by our elite educational institutions. But certainly, that is a price
worth paying to secure a more meaningful level of racial equality.
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INTRODUCTION
Now that recent Senate confirmation episodes have unapologetically
outed the Supreme Court as a political institution, it makes sense to wonder
how best to protect democratically adopted social policies from the
disapproving partisan preferences of our unelected judiciary. That task takes on
particular social significance in the quest for more meaningful levels of racial
equality following the deaths of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and countless
others. The way in which the task is performed can help determine whether
society moves forward toward its elusive goal of racial justice—something that
has always been more rhetorical than real—or moves backward to recapture a
time in which the culture’s chronic commitment to White superiority was as
explicit as it was oppressive.
Contemporary U.S. culture has now learned to mask overt racial bias with
indirect and structural forms of discriminatory treatment. As a result,
neutralizing racially disparate impact offers the most reliable way to end
ongoing racial discrimination. But the Supreme Court, in its famous Washington
v. Davis1 decision, rejected a discriminatory effects test and held that the
Constitution actually protects disparate impact discrimination as long as the
intent to privilege Whites is not overly conspicuous.2 The Court’s decision in
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney3 then constructed such a narrow
concept of intentional discrimination that even knowing indifference to racially
disparate harm is not intentional.4 The current law is simply not responsive to
contemporary forms of racial subordination. Although reliance on the
Washington v. Davis intentional discrimination standard has now become the
customary way of shielding White privilege from constitutional challenge, I am
guessing that a six-to-three racially conservative Supreme Court is nevertheless
unlikely to reconsider its rejection of disparate impact as a form of
unconstitutional discrimination. But there is a way around the Court’s
recalcitrance.
1.
2.
3.
4.

426 U.S. 229 (1976).
See id. at 244–45.
442 U.S. 256 (1979).
See id. at 278–79.

100 N.C. L. REV. 739 (2022)

2022]

RANDOM JUSTICE

741

All other things being equal, in a nondiscriminatory culture, we would
expect the distribution of societal resources to mirror the racial distribution of
individuals in the pertinent population. It would, therefore, make sense to
utilize so-called affirmative action programs to replicate the proportional
distribution of resources that our history of express and implicit racial bias has
precluded us from achieving naturally. However, in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke,5 Justice Powell barred race-conscious remedies for what he
termed “societal discrimination.”6 And in Grutter v. Bollinger,7 the Supreme
Court reaffirmed its oft-stated view that the pursuit of racial balance through
the use of quotas is “patently unconstitutional.”8 Those views are consistent
with a long history of Supreme Court decisions that have sacrificed nonwhite
minority interests in order to benefit the White majority. But within the
confines of the Court’s current equal protection jurisprudence, proponents of
racial equality could still seek to remedy the racially disparate impact of our
present resource allocation schemes by relying on chance in lieu of so-called
merit in the allocation of resources.
Consider university admissions. Rather than utilize the grade point
averages and standardized test scores that we typically view as measures of
merit, university admissions could instead be determined by lottery.
Statistically, the racial profile of an admitted class would then reflect the racial
profile of the applicant pool. Assuming there are no significant barriers to entry,
each racial group would get a share of university seats that roughly approximates
its proportion of the population. By randomizing admissions and minimizing
the degree to which traditional assessments of merit could be used as a proxy
for White privilege, lottery-based admissions could emulate the distribution of
educational resources that would exist in a nondiscriminatory culture.
Universities could ensure that they were admitting only qualified students
by setting minimum standards for participation in the lottery—as long as those
standards were not set in a way that simply replicated the racially disparate
impact of our current admissions criteria. Nevertheless, there would be a cost
to lottery admissions. As Justice Thomas recognized in his Grutter opinion, in
the absence of selective admissions criteria, prestigious universities would lose
one factor on which they rely to establish and perpetuate their elite status.9
Without being able to brag about the highly selective nature of their admissions
criteria, elite educational institutions would have to rely on things like the
5. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
6. Id. at 307–10.
7. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
8. Id. at 324–25, 329–30.
9. See id. at 354–56, 354 n.3 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also
Girardeau A. Spann, The Dark Side of Grutter, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 221, 236–39 (2004) [hereinafter
Spann, The Dark Side of Grutter] (discussing Justice Thomas’s opinion in Grutter).
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quality of their instruction, or the scholarly accomplishments of their faculty,
in order to maintain their elite reputations. But if we had to choose between an
admissions paradigm that allowed prestigious institutions to retain their elite
status and a paradigm that remedied the racially disparate impact embedded in
our educational system, choosing to remedy pervasive racial discrimination
seems plainly preferable. Analogous lottery-based selection strategies could also
be used to combat the racially disparate allocation of other societal benefits,
such as jobs, construction contracts, mortgages, and health care—all of which
have continued to privilege Whites disproportionately, despite our existing
legal prohibitions on racial discrimination.
The reason that racially disparate impact remains so pervasive is that our
culture has internalized, as one of its unexamined baseline assumptions, the
belief that resources are distributed fairly and equitably when Whites possess a
disproportionately large share of them. The advantage that Whites possess over
nonwhites is simply perceived to be part of the natural order. The Supreme
Court has even incorporated that skewed understanding of racial neutrality into
its interpretation of constitutional law by insisting that such pervasive societal
discrimination does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.10 That baseline
assumption is, of course, a form of White supremacy. And as a culture, we seem
to be addicted to the tacit baseline belief that nonwhites are simply inferior to
Whites. Accordingly, the history of the nation suggests that we will only be able
to practice racial equality if we force ourselves to do so. But, ironically, relying
on mere random chance can do a better job of forcing us to promote racial justice
than the unsuccessful measures we have tried thus far.
Part I of this Article explains why it is no longer tenable to view the
Supreme Court as anything other than the head of a branch of government that
is inherently political. Section I.A describes how Republicans have smugly
infused politics into the Senate confirmation process for Supreme Court
Justices and lower court judges in a way that has removed the fig leaf that
formerly camouflaged the political nature of the federal judiciary. Section I.B
describes the ways in which the political Supreme Court has historically favored
the interests of the White majority over the interests of nonwhites.
Part II discusses the way in which the contemporary Supreme Court has
adopted a model of discrimination that utilizes the Constitution to protect
White privilege. Section II.A describes the Supreme Court decision to use an
intentional discrimination standard to implement the Equal Protection Clause.
Section II.B describes how the Court’s intentional discrimination jurisprudence
has allowed racially disparate impact to persist in the allocation of virtually all
significant societal resources. Section II.C explains how Supreme Court

10. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326–31.
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prohibitions on efforts to remedy such disparate impact actually
constitutionalize existing levels of societal discrimination.
Part III argues that racial discrimination is so deeply embedded in U.S.
culture that it can only be exorcised through direct efforts to address the
disparate impact that racial discrimination produces. Section III.A describes
how the Court has generated a discriminatory law of affirmative action that
actually sacrifices the interests of nonwhites in order to advance the interests of
Whites. Section III.B describes how a lottery-based, randomized allocation of
resources offers a more realistic hope of achieving a meaningful level of racial
equality.
The Article concludes that we can only achieve racial justice if we are
willing to commit ourselves to a strategy that nullifies our tacit baseline belief
in White privilege. However, I fear that is a commitment we will be unwilling
to make—precisely because it might produce actual, rather than merely
rhetorical, equality.
I. THE POLITICAL COURT
In a recent Harvard Law Review Foreword, noted legal historian Michael
Klarman made the point directly:
The Supreme Court is and always has been a political institution,
meaning simply that the Justices’ legal interpretations are influenced by
their personal values and by their perception of the limits placed on their
decisionmaking by the contemporary social and political context. . . .
[S]ince the Founding, Justices resolving constitutional conflicts have
always had to make controversial choices that reflect their own values
and political calculations.11
As early as Marbury v. Madison,12 Chief Justice John Marshall was tacitly willing
to manipulate constitutional doctrine in ways that advanced the political
outcomes he favored.13 The tradition of politically influenced Supreme Court
adjudication has continued to the present day. But it has recently become so

11. Michael J. Klarman, The Degradation of American Democracy—and the Court, 134 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 224 (2020).
12. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
13. Chief Justice Marshall’s Marbury decision is commonly viewed as sacrificing Marshall’s
immediate goal of granting judicial commissions to judges appointed by a lame-duck Federalist
Congress in order to establish the judicial review power of courts to invalidate acts of the political
branches as unconstitutional, thereby giving the outgoing Federalist party the ability to retain some
political power over the incoming Jeffersonian Democratic-Republican Party. See JESSE H. CHOPER,
MICHAEL C. DORF, RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. & FREDERICK SCHAUER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 1–2, 11–14 (13th ed. 2019). Ironically, Chief Justice Marshall’s
opinion in Marbury itself stated emphatically that it was rejecting the existence of Supreme Court
jurisdiction over questions that were “in their nature political.” Marbury, 5 U.S. at 170.
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unapologetically salient that it is no longer plausible even to pretend that the
Court is anything other than part of a political branch of government.
A.

Partisan Politics

Despite the life tenure and salary protection that Article III of the
Constitution confers on federal judges in an effort to insulate them from
political influence,14 Supreme Court decisions have always reflected popular
sentiment.15 It has long been suspected that the Supreme Court follows the
election returns.16 In fact, Justice O’Connor is reported to have feared the
election of Al Gore as President in 2000 because she concluded that it would
mean she could not retire from the Supreme Court for at least another four
years—until a Republican President was in power to name her successor.17 In
addition, as they aged, Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Thomas, and Alito were all
urged by their political supporters to retire from the Supreme Court so that the
incumbent President could appoint as their successors younger Justices who
shared the President’s political views and who would be able to serve longer on
the Court.18
When President Trump became unhappy with a federal court decision that
rejected one of his anti-immigration initiatives, he called the judge a biased
“Obama judge.”19 Chief Justice Roberts publicly responded, stating: “We do not
have Obama judges or Trump judges, Bush judges or Clinton judges. What we
have is an extraordinary group of dedicated judges doing their level best to do
equal right to those appearing before them. . . . The independent judiciary is
something we should all be thankful for.”20 There may be some who actually
believe the assurance of judicial independence offered by Chief Justice Roberts.
But based on an opinion that they joined, not even Justices Thomas, Gorsuch,
or Kavanaugh appear to be among them.21 Proclamations of judicial
14. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
15. See generally BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009)
(describing how Supreme Court decisions are shaped by popular opinion).
16. See FINLEY PETER DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY’S OPINIONS 26 (1901) (“[N]o matther whether th’
constitution follows th’ flag or not, th’ supreme coort follows th’ iliction returns.”).
17. See Klarman, supra note 11, at 214–15.
18. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, With Democrats Poised To Take Over Washington, Supreme Court’s Breyer
Faces Renewed Calls To Retire, WASH. POST (Jan. 9, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/politics/courts_law/stephen-breyer-biden-supreme-court/2021/01/08/a3a49cf2-504f-11eb-bda4615aaefd0555_story.html [https://perma.cc/C8ZY-7E7M (dark archive)].
19. Katie Reilly, President Trump Escalates Attacks on ‘Obama Judges’ After Rare Rebuke from Chief
Justice, TIME, https://time.com/5461827/donald-trump-judiciary-chief-justice-john-roberts/ [https://
perma.cc/5ZYN-UL6Z (dark archive)] (Nov. 21, 2018, 6:32 PM).
20. Id.
21. See Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2576–77, 2582 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part, joined by Gorsuch, J., and Kavanaugh, J.); see also Editorial Board,
Opinion, John Roberts Said There Are No Trump Judges or Obama Judges. Clarence Thomas Didn’t Get the
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independence from the influence of politics are best understood as invitations
for all of us to engage in a polite legal fiction. That fiction is necessary to
camouflage a threat to the rule of law itself that would be destabilizing if frankly
acknowledged. However, the political influence submerged beneath that legal
fiction has now been conspicuously exposed.
As Senate majority leader, Republican Senator Mitch McConnell from
Kentucky controlled the Senate judicial-confirmation process in ways that
seemed intent on actually highlighting, rather than disguising, the political
nature of the Supreme Court and the lower courts.22 Twenty-four hours after
the sudden, unfortunate death of Justice Scalia in February 2016, McConnell
announced that the Senate would not hold confirmation hearings on anyone
whom President Obama nominated to replace Justice Scalia—without even
knowing the identity of whomever President Obama would later select.23
McConnell’s stated justification for refusing confirmation hearings was that in
a presidential election year, the winner of the November election should select
the replacement Justice.24
McConnell adhered to this position even after President Obama
nominated District of Columbia Court of Appeals Judge Merrick Garland—
someone whose qualifications and ideological moderation seemed beyond
question.25 No Republican Senator objected to McConnell’s strategy.26 Indeed,
three Republican Senators went so far as to announce that if Hillary Clinton
won the 2016 presidential election, they would vote to block her nomination of
any Supreme Court Justice—during her entire term of office—as long as
Republicans retained control of the Senate.27 Those three Senators apparently
did not feel limited by McConnell’s purported principle of denying Supreme

Memo., WASH. POST (June 28, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/john-roberts-saidthere-are-no-trump-judges-or-obama-judges-clarence-thomas-didnt-get-the-memo/2019/06/28/
00ec5db0-99c6-11e9-8d0a-5edd7e2025b1_story.html [https://perma.cc/S7JW-QFRG (dark archive)]
(discussing an opinion joined by those Justices in a Census citizenship question case that suggested
political bias of a lower court judge). Justice Alito also made an unusual and highly political speech to
the Federalist Society on November 12, 2020, that further undermined the assertion of Chief Justice
Roberts that Justices are apolitical. See Adam Liptak, In Unusually Political Speech, Alito Says Liberals
Pose Threat to Liberties, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/13/us/samuelalito-religious-liberty-free-speech.html?searchResultPosition=2 [https://perma.cc/XL9B-DWL7 (dark
archive)].
22. See Klarman, supra note 11, at 247.
23. Id.
24. See id. But see Peter Baker & Maggie Haberman, McConnell Vows Vote on Ginsburg Replacement
as Her Death Upends the 2020 Race, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/
18/us/politics/mitch-mcconnell-supreme-court-ruth-bader-ginsburg.html [https://perma.cc/KY93-XL
PQ (dark archive)].
25. See Klarman, supra note 11, at 247.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 247–48; see also Baker & Haberman, supra note 24.
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Court confirmation hearings only during an election year. But neither did
McConnell himself.
McConnell made this brutally clear when Justice Ginsburg sadly died on
September 18, 2020.28 McConnell had refused to hold hearings on any nominee
that President Obama selected to replace Justice Scalia nine months before the
2016 presidential election between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump.29 But
after Justice Ginsburg’s death, McConnell immediately announced that he
would hold hearings to confirm any nominee that President Trump selected to
replace her a mere forty-six days before the November 3, 2020, presidential
election between Joe Biden and Donald Trump.30 Once again, McConnell did
this before even knowing who the Trump nominee would be.31
Republican Senate Judiciary Committee Chair Charles Grassley of Iowa
and his Republican successor Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina also
adopted—and then abandoned—McConnell’s presidential-election-year
principle in 2016 and 2020, respectively.32 They did this in order to deny a
committee hearing to Garland and then grant one to a Trump nominee.33
Notwithstanding the pretextual election-year explanation, the actual
Republican governing principle appears to have been that Supreme Court
vacancies should be filled in ways that maximize Supreme Court support for
the Republican political agenda. In his own defense, McConnell reminded
critics that “[e]lections have consequences.”34
On October 26, 2020, eight days before the November 3 presidential
election, the Senate rushed to confirm Seventh Circuit Judge Amy Coney
Barrett—a conservative Republican protégé of Justice Scalia—as Justice
Ginsburg’s replacement.35 Except for one Republican defection, the vote was
along party lines.36 For the first time in 151 years, a Supreme Court Justice was
confirmed without support from a single member of the minority party.37
President Trump would go on to lose the election to Joe Biden, and Republicans
28. Klarman, supra note 11, at 248.
29. See id. at 247–48; Baker & Haberman, supra note 24.
30. Baker & Haberman, supra note 24.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. Paul Waldman, Opinion, You’re Darn Right Biden Has a Mandate. Now He Has To Act Like It.,
WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2020, 12:04 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/11/
09/youre-darn-right-biden-has-mandate-now-he-has-act-like-it/ [https://perma.cc/2TF3-ZUXJ (dark
archive)]; see also Mitch McConnell on ACB Vote: Elections Have Consequences, GRABIEN (Oct. 26, 2020),
https://grabien.com/story.php?id=311675 [https://perma.cc/6SL9-6G9L].
35. See Nicholas Fandos, Senate Confirms Barrett, Delivering for Trump and Reshaping the Court,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/26/us/politics/senate-confirmsbarrett.html [https://perma.cc/5FJ2-D6PR (dark archive)] [hereinafter Fandos, Senate Confirms
Barrett].
36. See id.
37. Id.
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would go on to lose control of the Senate.38 Accordingly, the confirmation of
Justice Barrett had the effect of giving political control over a Supreme Court
seat to what shortly became a lame-duck President and a lame-duck Senate.
Indeed, during the Senate confirmation hearings, Democratic Senator
Dick Durbin of Illinois stated that President Trump had nominated Judge
Barrett to “rule in his favor on any election contest.”39 And as Durbin predicted,
Trump continually blamed his election loss on false claims of widespread voter
fraud.40 However, those claims were sufficiently baseless that they were
repeatedly rejected by numerous courts, including a Supreme Court containing
three Trump nominees.41 Nevertheless, Trump’s continued insistence on his
false voter fraud claims fueled conspiracy theories among his supporters. That
eventually led to Trump’s January 13, 2021, impeachment by the House of
Representatives for inciting insurrection, after his supporters violently stormed
and took over the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, in an effort to overturn the
presidential election.42 Trump is the only President in U.S. history to have been
impeached twice.43
McConnell’s Senate confirmation strategy also had the effect of giving
Republicans control over a large number of lower federal court judicial
appointments.44 During the last two years of Obama’s presidency, McConnell
blocked confirmation of all but two of President Obama’s appellate court
nominees.45 That gave President Trump a very large number of appellate and
trial court vacancies to fill when he assumed office.46 Justice Barrett was

38. See Andrew Solender, Democrats Take Full Control of Government as Ossoff, Warnock Win Georgia
Senate Seats, FORBES (Jan. 6, 2021, 4:11 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/andrewsolender/2021/
01/06/democrats-seize-full-control-of-government-as-ossoff-warnock-win-georgia-senate-seats/?sh=67
78ca08737b [https://perma.cc/6ZTB-LSGA (dark archive)].
39. Evie Fordham, Trump Rushing Barrett Confirmation Because of Contested Election Fears, Durbin
Claims, FOX NEWS (Oct. 12, 2020), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/durbin-amy-coney-barrettconfirmation-hearing [https://perma.cc/C2NE-6X9G].
40. See id.; Jim Rutenberg, Nick Corasaniti & Alan Feuer, Trump’s Fraud Claims Died in Court,
but the Myth of Stolen Elections Lives On, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/
12/26/us/politics/republicans-voter-fraud.html [https://perma.cc/4QJL-XDB9 (dark archive)].
41. See Rutenberg et al., supra note 40.
42. See Mike DeBonis & Paul Kane, House Hands Trump a Second Impeachment, This Time with
GOP Support, WASH. POST (Jan. 13, 2021, 7:47 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/houseimpeachment-trump/2021/01/13/05fe731c-55c5-11eb-a931-5b162d0d033d_story.html [https://perma.
cc/W3EP-QQ4P (dark archive)]; Nicholas Fandos, Trump Impeached for Inciting Insurrection, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 13, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/13/us/politics/trump-impeached.html?
action=click&module=Spotlight&pgtype=Homepage [https://perma.cc/TN9L-AKPP (dark archive)]
[hereinafter Fandos, Trump Impeached].
43. See DeBonis & Kane, supra note 42; Fandos, Trump Impeached, supra note 42.
44. See Klarman, supra note 11, at 250–51.
45. Id.
46. See id.
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Trump’s third Supreme Court addition, but McConnell also enabled Trump to
fill 162 federal district court seats, and 53 seats on federal courts of appeals.47
During his four years in office, Trump was able to appoint approximately
one-third of the federal appellate bench.48 That has led many to discuss courtpacking remedies49 and other strategies for reducing Republican partisan
control over the Supreme Court and the federal judiciary.50 In support of such
strategies, Professor Klarman has argued that Democrats would actually be
“unpacking” the Supreme Court, after McConnell’s confirmation strategies
succeeded in shrinking the size of the Court to eight for one year and then
increasing it back to nine once Trump became President.51 Klarman stressed
that McConnell’s partisan use of the Senate confirmation process showed that
Republicans would not themselves hesitate to regulate the size of the Supreme
Court if they thought it would give them a partisan political advantage.52
McConnell’s political use of the Senate confirmation process is not
technically unconstitutional, but it does violate previously established norms
about how the confirmation process is supposed to work.53 Such a political
strategy has come to be known as playing constitutional “hardball.”54
McConnell could, of course, have secured the Supreme Court appointments he
favored by holding customary confirmation hearings and having the Senate
Republican majority reject President Obama’s Garland nomination and confirm
President Trump’s Barrett nomination. But by hypocritically refusing to hold
hearings on Garland, pursuant to a principle that he would later defy in holding
hearings on Barrett, McConnell supplanted even the pretense that Supreme
Court selections were about anything other than politics.
Because of McConnell’s politically motivated manipulation of the Senate
confirmation process for Supreme Court Justices, President Trump was able to
appoint three Justices to the Supreme Court, thereby giving the current Court
a six-to-three majority of conservative Republican Justices.55 President Trump
47. See Fandos, Senate Confirms Barrett, supra note 35.
48. Id.
49. See Jamelle Bouie, Opinion, Court Packing Can Be an Instrument of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/09/opinion/court-packing-amy-coney-barrett.html?searc
hResultPosition=5 [https://perma.cc/GGV3-KBJ6 (dark archive)].
50. See Emily Bazelon, Kent Greenfield, Steven G. Calabresi, Melody Wang, Aaron Tang, Larry
Kramer, Leah Litman & Randy Barnett, Opinion, How To Fix the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
27, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/10/27/opinion/supreme-court-reform.html?sear
chResultPosition=1 [https://perma.cc/GC3G-BKE8 (dark archive)].
51. See Klarman, supra note 11, at 247–49.
52. See id. at 251–52.
53. See id. at 248–51.
54. See id. at 167 (“Political or constitutional ‘hardball’ refers to political behavior that challenges
traditional norms without violating clearly established legal rules.”).
55. See Linda Greenhouse, Opinion, The Supreme Court Is Now 6-3. What Does That Mean?, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/05/opinion/supreme-court-amy-coneybarrett.html?searchResultPosition=7 [https://perma.cc/4MVW-CSJ7 (dark archive)]; Thomas B.
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made a strategic campaign decision to announce that he would select his
Supreme Court nominees from a list of reliably conservative Republican
candidates compiled by conservative organizations such as The Federalist
Society.56
In all likelihood, if McConnell had adhered to the normal Senate
confirmation process for Supreme Court Justices, President Trump would only
have been able to appoint one Justice. President Obama would have been able
to nominate Merrick Garland to replace Justice Scalia, and a majority of
Senators playing by normal rules would have confirmed that nomination. In
addition, President Biden would have been able to nominate the successor to
Justice Ginsburg and, like Obama, Biden would almost certainly have
nominated a candidate who would have been confirmed by a majority of
Senators adhering to normal confirmation standards. Absent McConnell’s
political manipulation of the confirmation process, the current Supreme Court
would have had a five-to-four liberal majority, rather than its present six-tothree conservative majority.
If politics matter so much, it must be because politics, rather than doctrine,
determines how a divided Supreme Court will rule on close constitutional
questions. By acknowledging in an obvious way that such decisions are
determined more by the political and ideological leanings of the Justices than
by the constitutional doctrines that the Justices purport to interpret, McConnell
seems to have haughtily flaunted his political power in a way that undermines
even the cosmetic pretense that the Supreme Court is a nonpolitical body.
Therefore, when a Supreme Court Justice says, “The Constitution
requires . . . ,” what we should hear is, “My political ideology requires . . . ,” and
we should adjust our level of deference accordingly. If the emperor is indeed
wearing no clothes, perhaps we should thank Senator McConnell for making it
now permissible to admit what we have always been reluctant to say out loud.
But as part of a political branch of government, the Supreme Court, and its
racial politics, has historically posed a problem for racial justice that can no
longer plausibly be hidden beneath the veneer of neutral constitutional rhetoric.
B.

White Privilege

A Supreme Court that operates as the head of a political branch of
government is a threat to racial equality. As I have argued in the past, Supreme
Court Justices are likely to share an elite majoritarian acculturation that makes
Edsall, Opinion, The Right’s Relentless Supreme Court Justice Picking Machine, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/01/opinion/amy-coney-barrett-supreme-court.html?searchResultP
osition=6 [https://perma.cc/DCP3-F8KP (dark archive)].
56. See Tyler Olson, An Inside Look at How Trump’s Supreme Court List Is Made: “A Tremendous
Investment of Time,” FOX NEWS (July 10, 2020), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/behind-the-scenesof-how-trumps-supreme-court-list-is-made [https://perma.cc/5QEV-D5CE].
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them more sympathetic to White interests than to those of nonwhites.57 As the
Legal Realists have taught us, legal doctrine is too indeterminate to constrain
judicial discretion in a way that is sufficient to prevent a judge’s political values
and biases from influencing the judge’s decision.58 Accordingly, when the
political Supreme Court knowingly or unknowingly infuses its political policy
preferences into its doctrinal decisions, it is likely to do so in a way that reflects
majoritarian views on race.59 Not surprisingly, therefore, the Supreme Court
has customarily been one of the social institutions on which majoritarian U.S.
culture relies to protect White privilege.60 Unfortunately, the history of
Supreme Court decisions in race cases contains many infamous examples.
The 1842 decision in Prigg v. Pennsylvania61 provides one of the most
egregious early cases in which the Supreme Court sacrificed the interests of
Blacks to advance the interests of Whites. Pennsylvania passed a statute
prohibiting the removal by force from the state of anyone claimed to be a
runaway slave without first establishing legal ownership of the claimed slave
through the judicial process prescribed by the statute.62 In Prigg, the Supreme
Court held that the Pennsylvania statute violated the Rendition Clause of
Article IV, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution and the federal Fugitive Slave
Act of 1793 by interfering with the property rights of slave owners.63 The Prigg
decision not only permitted the reenslavement of a woman who had escaped
slavery in Maryland, but it also permitted the enslavement of her two children,
one of whom was born free in Pennsylvania under a Pennsylvania statute
providing for the gradual abolition of slavery.64
In addition, Prigg facilitated continuation of the practice depicted in the
autobiographical book and subsequent Academy Award-winning movie Twelve
Years a Slave, where slave traders responded to the 1808 abolition of the African
slave trade by kidnapping free Blacks in northern states and then selling them
into slavery in southern states.65 Regardless of how one feels about the
abolitionist sentiments that may have motivated the enactment of the
Pennsylvania statute, the Prigg decision sacrificed the liberty interest of at least
some free Blacks in order to protect the asserted property interests of White

57. See GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT: THE SUPREME COURT AND
MINORITIES IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 1–6 (1993) [hereinafter SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE
COURT].
58. See id. at 59.
59. See id. at 19–23.
60. See id. at 130–36.
61. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539.
62. Id. at 540.
63. See id. at 611, 613.
64. See id. at 543, 557.
65. See SOLOMON NORTHUP, TWELVE YEARS A SLAVE (David Wilson ed., 2014); 12 YEARS A
SLAVE (Regency Enterprises et al. Nov. 8, 2013).
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slave owners. Prigg allowed those free Blacks to be kidnapped from their
northern homes and sold into southern slavery.
Perhaps the best-known antebellum Supreme Court decision that
sacrificed the interests of Blacks for the interests of Whites is Dred Scott v.
Sandford.66 In Dred Scott, the Supreme Court invalidated the Missouri
Compromise Act of 1820, which Congress had passed in an effort to limit the
spread of slavery in new territories as the United States expanded westward.67
In the process of invalidating the federal statute, the Supreme Court tried its
hand at resolving the contentious political issue of slavery. The Court held that
the statute seeking to limit the spread of slavery unconstitutionally interfered
with the property interests of slave owners.68 In addition—despite having ruled
on the merits—the Supreme Court held that it lacked diversity jurisdiction to
entertain the case. Thus, even though the plaintiff and the defendant resided in
different states, there was no diversity of citizenship because the plaintiff was
Black, and Blacks could not be citizens within the meaning of the U.S.
Constitution.69 In so holding, the language that Chief Justice Taney used in
characterizing the framers’ intent, on which his holding was based, is
notoriously demeaning in its racial depiction of Blacks as subhuman:
The words “people of the United States” and “citizens” are synonymous
terms, and mean the same thing. They both describe the political body
who, according to our republican institutions, form the sovereignty, and
who hold the power and conduct the Government through their
representatives. They are what we familiarly call the “sovereign people,”
and every citizen is one of this people, and a constituent member of this
sovereignty. The question before us is, whether the class of persons
described in the plea in abatement compose a portion of this people, and
are constituent members of this sovereignty? We think they are not, and
that they are not included, and were not intended to be included, under
the word “citizens” in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of
the rights and privileges which that instrument provides for and secures
to citizens of the United States. On the contrary, they were at that time
considered as a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been
subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet
remained subject to their authority, and had no rights or privileges but
such as those who held the power and the Government might choose to
grant them. . . .
It is difficult at this day to realize the state of public opinion in relation
to that unfortunate race, which prevailed in the civilized and enlightened
66. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (enslaved party), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV.
67. See id. at 452.
68. See id. at 451–52.
69. Id. at 404–06.
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portions of the world at the time of the Declaration of Independence,
and when the Constitution of the United States was framed and adopted.
But the public history of every European nation displays it in a manner
too plain to be mistaken.
They had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an
inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either
in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no rights
which the white man was bound to respect; and that the negro might
justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit. He was bought
and sold, and treated as an ordinary article of merchandise and traffic,
whenever a profit could be made by it. This opinion was at that time
fixed and universal in the civilized portion of the white race. It was
regarded as an axiom in morals as well as in politics, which no one
thought of disputing, or supposed to be open to dispute; and men in
every grade and position in society daily and habitually acted upon it in
their private pursuits, as well as in matters of public concern, without
doubting for a moment the correctness of this opinion.70
The Supreme Court’s effort in Dred Scott to resolve the political debate
over the issue of slavery by constitutionalizing the racial inferiority of Blacks
did not work out well. It ultimately led to the Civil War and, after the Northern
victory, to the Reconstruction Amendments to the Constitution. The 1865
Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery.71 The 1868 Fourteenth Amendment
broadly granted privileges and immunities, due process rights, and equal
protection rights, which extended to Blacks.72 The 1870 Fifteenth Amendment
prohibited racial discrimination in voting.73 Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment directly overruled Dred Scott by granting natural-born citizenship
to all persons, including Blacks.74 However, the Supreme Court’s political
preference for Whites over Blacks did not end with the adoption of the
Reconstruction Amendments.
After Congress exercised its remedial powers under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which prohibited
racial discrimination in public accommodations, the Supreme Court invalidated
the Act. The 1883 Civil Rights Cases75 established a new state action requirement,
holding that the Fourteenth Amendment did not give Congress the power to
prohibit private acts of racial discrimination.76 If there was any lingering doubt
about whether the post-Civil War Supreme Court was motivated by a political
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

See id. at 404–05, 407.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
Id. amend. XIV.
Id. amend. XV.
See id. amend. XIV, § 1.
109 U.S. 3.
Id. at 18–19.
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preference for Whites over Blacks, it was eliminated by the Court’s subsequent
decision in Plessy v. Ferguson.77
The 1896 decision of the Supreme Court in Plessy upheld the Jim Crow
regime of separate-but-equal racial segregation in the South, finding that such
racial discrimination did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.78 The Court held that if Blacks thought that “the
enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of
inferiority. . . . [I]t is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely
because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.”79 The Court
also rejected the idea that “social prejudices may be overcome by legislation . . . .
If the two races are to meet upon terms of social equality, it must be the result
of natural affinities.”80 The majority in Plessy had so acquiesced in the Jim Crow
racial politics of the South that racial segregation was not even a form of racial
discrimination for the Court. Moreover, the racial prejudices and societal
attitudes of Black inferiority that prevailed in the South were beyond the law’s
ability to redress.
Not surprisingly, it turned out that the separate-but-equal doctrine did not
really mean equal at all. Rather, the doctrine was constitutional even when it
meant separate but unequal. The Supreme Court made that abundantly clear in
its 1899 Cumming v. Board of Education81 decision. In Cumming, the Court upheld
the constitutionality of the Richmond County, Georgia, segregated school
system under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, even
though the school system had a segregated high school for White students but
no high school at all for Black students.82 Moreover, the Court held it was
permissible for Richmond County to tax Black parents for the funds necessary
to maintain the White high school, despite the fact that their Black children
could not attend it.83
The race-based political biases of the Supreme Court have not been
limited to favoring the interests of Whites over Blacks. Another of the Court’s
infamous race cases involved discrimination against Japanese American citizens.
In the 1944 case of Korematsu v. United States,84 the Supreme Court upheld a
World War II exclusion order that expelled people with Japanese ancestry from
certain areas on the West Coast, even though many of the people subject to the

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

163 U.S. 537 (1896).
See id. at 544–52.
Id. at 551.
Id.
175 U.S. 528.
See id. at 544–45.
See id. at 531, 545.
323 U.S. 214 (1944), abrogated by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
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exclusion order barring them from returning to their own homes were loyal
American citizens.85
A year earlier, in the 1943 case of Hirabayashi v. United States,86 the Court
had similarly upheld a military curfew order that required enemy aliens,
including people of Japanese descent, to remain in their homes everyday
between the hours of 8 p.m. and 6 a.m.87 The curfew and exclusion orders
upheld in Hirabayashi and Korematsu ultimately led to the now widely
condemned World War II confinement of Japanese American citizens in
concentration camps that the government referred to as “relocation centers.”88
In its 1944 Ex parte Endo89 decision issued the same day as Korematsu, a
unanimous Court did grant a detainee’s habeas corpus petition, holding that
concededly loyal American citizens could not be held in the concentration
camps.90 But Korematsu and Hirabayashi remain troubling, because they were
decided after the 1942 Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor. They illustrate that
wartime hysteria can infect even the politics of Supreme Court constitutional
decisions.
Japanese residents were not the only Asians whom the Supreme Court
subjected to invidious discriminatory treatment. For example, in the Chinese
Exclusion Cases,91 the Court upheld the Chinese Exclusion Act, which banned
Chinese immigration in order to protect White laborers from competition by
Chinese laborers.92
And, of course, Indigenous people have always been treated dreadfully by
the United States, through the abrogation of treaties and through genocide.93
The Supreme Court made this all possible by upholding the United States’
seizure of land from Indigenous people through conquest in Johnson v.
McIntosh.94 Then, in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,95 the Court allowed the seizure
of those lands by White settlers, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to enforce
Indigenous land claims because the Cherokee Nation was not a foreign state,
85. Id. at 216–20.
86. 320 U.S. 81.
87. See id. at 88, 100–02.
88. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223–24.
89. 323 U.S. 283.
90. Id. at 297.
91. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1905).
92. See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 609; Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 707; Ju Toy, 198 U.S. at 263.
See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 509–10 (2d ed. 1985)
(describing discrimination against Chinese workers).
93. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 92, at 508–09. See generally DEE BROWN, BURY MY HEART AT
WOUNDED KNEE: AN INDIAN HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WEST (1970) (describing the treatment
of Indigenous people); PETER MATTHIESSEN, IN THE SPIRIT OF CRAZY HORSE (1980) (same);
MARI SANDOZ, CRAZY HORSE: THE STRANGE MAN OF THE OGLALAS (1942) (same).
94. 21 U.S. 543, 587–92 (1823).
95. 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
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but rather a “domestic dependent nation[],” that was “completely under the
sovereignty and dominion of the United States.”96 The Supreme Court did,
however, subsequently recognize Indigenous tribal sovereignty in Worcester v.
Georgia.97 But President Andrew Jackson declined to enforce the Court’s order,
allowing Georgia to expel 15,000 Cherokee tribe members from their land, after
which 4,000 died in a forced westward march that has come to be known as the
“Trail of Tears.”98
The Supreme Court has a long history of tolerating discrimination against
nonwhites. But despite this history, the Court’s 1954 decision in Brown v. Board
of Education99 overruled Plessy and held that racial segregation in public schools
was inherently unequal.100 One might be tempted to argue that, by disregarding
massive southern resistance and desegregating southern schools, Brown
demonstrated the ability of the Supreme Court to marginalize the effect of
politics on its constitutional decisions. But that is not what happened. Rather,
Brown is better understood as illustrating Supreme Court capitulation to the
elite northern political desire to end the outdated de jure racial discrimination
of the South, which was becoming an embarrassment to the nation during the
civil rights movement. Indeed, the Justice Department amicus brief supporting
desegregation in Brown emphasized how southern segregation was proving to
be an impediment to the nation’s competition with communism in exerting
influence over developing third-world countries.101
Moreover, the 1954 Brown decision was not the Supreme Court’s final
pronouncement in the desegregation political debate. In 1955, the Supreme
Court issued its decision in Brown II102 after reargument addressed to the issue
of remedy.103 Rather than order southern schools to desegregate immediately,
the Court ordered the schools to desegregate “with all deliberate speed.”104 The
“all deliberate speed” formulation turned out to mean that segregated southern
school districts would end up having the next decade to engage in successful
massive resistance techniques designed to evade the Brown desegregation
decree.105 Ten years after Brown, only 1.2% of Black students in the South
96. Id. at 13, 17.
97. 31 U.S. 515, 559–61 (1832).
98. See Worcester v. Georgia, ENCYC. BRITANNICA (Feb. 24, 2021), https://www.britannica.com/
topic/Worcester-v-Georgia [https://perma.cc/KP45-JEFJ].
99. 347 U.S. 483.
100. Id. at 494–95.
101. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 3–8, 31–32, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954) (Nos. 1, 2, 4 & 10), 1952 WL 82045; see also Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold
War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61, 65 (1988).
102. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294.
103. Id. at 298.
104. Id. at 301.
105. See CHOPER ET AL., supra note 13, at 1412–13. See generally SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE
COURT, supra note 57, at 104–10 (discussing failure to desegregate schools after Brown).
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attended schools that were actually desegregated.106 When southern schools
finally began moving toward a meaningful level of school desegregation ten
years after Brown, that progress was produced not by the Supreme Court but
rather by the intervention of Congress and federal executive officials who
threatened government lawsuits and educational fund cutoffs if the schools did
not desegregate.107 When the Supreme Court finally began to invalidate
southern evasion techniques, it responded to politics in the form of a renewed
national commitment to end southern school segregation that grew out of the
civil rights movement.108 Far from resisting the nation’s racial politics, the
Supreme Court was simply reflecting them.
When the school desegregation effort moved North and West, the nation’s
political commitment to desegregation broke down. Those who had favored
desegregation in the South did not favor it in the North and West, where their
own children would actually be forced to go to integrated schools. And the
Supreme Court responded accordingly, issuing a series of decisions that enabled
schools to remain de facto segregated.109 For example, in Keyes v. School District
No. 1,110 the Court emphasized that the Constitution prohibited only de facto,
and not de jure, discrimination.111 In Milliken v. Bradley,112 the Court read the
Equal Protection Clause to prohibit interdistrict busing remedies, thereby
eliminating the only practical way of desegregating inner-city and suburban
schools, which had been segregated by de facto residential patterns rather than
by state laws.113 In Oklahoma City Board of Education v. Dowell,114 the Court held
that a period of good-faith compliance with a desegregation plan eliminated a
school district’s unconstitutional de jure segregation, even if the racial identities
of the schools remained unchanged.115 And in Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,116 the Court held that the Constitution
prohibited even voluntary race-conscious efforts to prevent de facto
resegregation.117
Brown is said to have desegregated public schools, but in fact, it did no
such thing. Today, the nation’s public schools remain badly segregated. Even
106. See CHOPER ET AL., supra note 13, at 1413.
107. See id. at 1413–14; SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT, supra note 57, at 98.
108. See CHOPER ET AL., supra note 13, at 1414–16; SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT, supra
note 57, at 104–10; cf. id. at 78–82.
109. See CHOPER ET AL., supra note 13, at 1416–19; SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT, supra
note 57, at 75–82.
110. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
111. Id. at 208–09.
112. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
113. Id. at 744–47.
114. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
115. Id. at 249–50.
116. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
117. Id. at 709–11, 720–25.
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those schools that eventually became desegregated after Brown II are now being
resegregated under the Supreme Court’s more recent precedents.118 Brown is
also said to have eliminated the government’s use of racial classifications. But it
has not done that either. The government continues to utilize explicit racial
classifications in racial profiling by police and airport security officials. It also
uses racial classifications in a variety of other settings including the Census,
adoption standards, drug profiles, immigration stops, and laws providing for
special treatment of Indigenous people.119 Ironically, Brown is perhaps more
important today as a precedent that is invoked to invalidate affirmative action
programs than as a case that promotes integration.120 The Equal Protection
Clause has now become so stridently insistent on the de facto segregation of
public schools—and the beneficial agglomeration of educational inputs and
outputs that segregation confers on White students—that Professor Erika
Wilson has called for the use of antitrust laws, rather than the Equal Protection
Clause, to challenge the White privilege that characterizes our educational
system.121
It would be unrealistic to expect the Supreme Court, as the head of a
branch of government that is inevitably political, to operate free from the
influence of politics. The Justices, and lower-court federal judges, are
nominated and confirmed largely because of their political and ideological
views. Historically, the politics of the Supreme Court has tended to favor the
sacrifice of nonwhite minority interests in order to advance the interests of the
White majority. But this is not just a historical artifact. The racial jurisprudence
of the contemporary Supreme Court has displayed a similar commitment to
White privilege.
II. THE CONTEMPORARY COURT
Consistent with the function of safeguarding White privilege, the
contemporary Supreme Court has adopted a racial jurisprudence that continues
to facilitate the advancement of White interests at the expense of nonwhites.
The law that the Court has developed to govern the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause prohibition on racial discrimination actually
legitimates more discrimination than it prohibits. The prohibition now applies
only to a narrow form of intentional discrimination and does not apply to
actions that have only discriminatory effects. Today, most forms of
118. See Girardeau A. Spann, Proposition 209, 47 DUKE L.J. 187, 280–83 (1997) [hereinafter Spann,
Proposition 209]; see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 803–
04 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (asserting that the majority imposes impediments to remedies for
resegregation).
119. See Spann, Proposition 209, supra note 118, at 280–83.
120. See id. at 192–93.
121. See Erika K. Wilson, Monopolizing Whiteness, 134 HARV. L. REV. 2382, 2384–88 (2021).
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contemporary racial discrimination do not employ the express racial
classifications that characterized the Jim Crow era. Rather, they utilize
purportedly neutral standards that do not mention race. But implicit biases and
structural features of society nevertheless cause those standards to have a
racially disparate impact. By placing disparate impact beyond the reach of the
Constitution, the Court has allowed the culture to sacrifice nonwhite minority
interests in order to advance the interests of Whites. This has created vast,
racially correlated discrepancies in the way that societal resources are
distributed. But the Supreme Court has viewed those discrepancies as a form
of “societal discrimination” that is permissible under the Constitution.122 In fact,
the Court has read the Constitution actually to prohibit use of the most effective
remedies that could be invoked to address the problem of societal
discrimination.
A.

Intentional Discrimination

In its 1976 Washington v. Davis decision, the Supreme Court held that the
equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment—which applied the
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection principle to the federal government—
prohibited intentional discrimination, but did not prohibit official acts that had
only a racially disparate impact.123 Accordingly, the verbal skills test that the
District of Columbia used to select its police officers did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause even though it resulted in the hiring of a disproportionately
high number of White officers and a disproportionately low number of Black
officers. Because the intent of the test was to ensure adequate verbal skills in
police officers, and not to discriminate against Black applicants, use of the test
was not unconstitutional.124
The Washington v. Davis concept of intentional discrimination was further
narrowed by the Court’s 1979 decision in Feeney. In that case, the Court held
that to qualify as discriminatory intent for Washington v. Davis purposes, the
government’s actuating motive had to be “because of” an action’s discriminatory
consequences. The government’s mere incidental willingness to take an action
“in spite of” its known disparate impact was not sufficient to establish an equal
protection violation.125
The Equal Protection Clause applies strict scrutiny to racial
classifications.126 But that strict scrutiny is not triggered unless the
government’s motive is sufficiently invidious to establish the existence of a
122. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 731.
123. 426 U.S. 229, 238–48.
124. See id. at 245–46.
125. See Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 278–81.
126. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944), abrogated by Trump v. Hawaii, 138
S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
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racial classification under the Washington v. Davis and Feeney tests. Because
government officials are almost always able to articulate some nonracial goal
that might be advanced by the actions that they take, “in spite of” the racially
disparate impact of their actions,127 it is often difficult to prove the invidious
intent required by Washington v. Davis and Feeney. As a result, the Supreme
Court’s intentional discrimination standard provides constitutional cover for
large amounts of racially disparate impact in the allocation of societal resources.
The Supreme Court could easily have avoided its Washington v. Davis
choice to tolerate disparate impact, by relying instead on the decision it
announced five years earlier in 1971 in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.128 The Griggs
Court held that the existence of racial discrimination in employment, which is
prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, was to be assessed under
a disparate impact test rather than an intentional discrimination test.129 If a
discriminatory effects test was appropriate for racial discrimination claims
brought under a federal civil rights statute in Griggs, it is not clear why a
discriminatory effects test was not also appropriate for racial discrimination
claims brought under the Equal Protection Clause.
The Equal Protection Clause was a core civil rights provision of the
Reconstruction Amendments, and was adopted explicitly to guard against
foreseeable discrimination against Blacks after the Civil War.130 Indeed, after
Griggs, most lower federal courts had applied the discriminatory effects test to
equal protection claims as well as to Title VII claims.131 Prior to Washington v.
Davis, even the Supreme Court itself had suggested that a disparate impact
standard would apply to discrimination claims brought under the Equal
Protection Clause.132
What is perhaps most telling is the reason that the Washington v. Davis
Court offered for adopting a discriminatory intent standard in lieu of a
discriminatory effects standard. The Court concluded that the use of a disparate
impact standard under the Equal Protection Clause would simply encompass
too many cases.133 In other words, it was precisely because racially disparate
impact had become so widespread in U.S. culture that it could not be deemed
unconstitutional. Invalidating disparate impact would undermine the White
privilege to which the culture had become accustomed as a form of racial
entitlement.

127.
128.
129.
130.

Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279.
401 U.S. 424.
See id. at 429–32.
See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUITY 8–60 (2004).
131. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 236–37, 244–45, 245 n.12 (1976).
132. See id. at 242–44.
133. See id. at 238–48.
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The underlying facts of Washington v. Davis itself further illustrate how
ubiquitous racially disparate impact has become, and how that disparate impact
has reinforced baseline assumptions about what constitutes racial neutrality in
our contemporary culture.134 The verbal skills test that the Court upheld in
Washington v. Davis, despite its racially disparate effect on the makeup of the
Washington D.C. police force, had never been validated to show any connection
to the job performance of police officers.135 Even if it had been validated,
however, the verbal skills test was almost certainly based on White English
verbal skills rather than Ebonics or Black English verbal skills. In the 1970s, the
population of Washington, D.C., was seventy percent Black.136 But the
Supreme Court had no difficulty characterizing a White English test as racially
neutral, even in a predominantly Black city. White privilege is so firmly infused
into the baseline assumptions shared by White culture that it never even occurs
to most people to question the racial tilt built into such assumptions.
I am not suggesting that invidious racial discrimination has ceased to exist
in the United States. The storming and siege of the U.S. Capitol on January 6,
2021, by Confederate flag wielding White supremacist Trump supporters shows
that defiantly explicit racism still exists in this country.137 Congressional
testimony revealed that multiple Trump supporters involved in the siege
repeatedly shouted an odious racial epithet at a Black Capitol police officer who
was trying to defend the Capitol.138 But most contemporary racial
discrimination is more indirect and subtle. It is produced by structural features
of the culture. For example, bank lending criteria can make it more difficult for
nonwhites to buy homes or get business loans because a history of racial
discrimination has left them with lower quality jobs, lower salaries, and less
property, which often has lower market value that can be used as collateral.139
134. See id. at 245–46.
135. See id. at 235–36, 246–48.
136. Campbell Gibson & Kay Jung, Historical Census Statistics on Population Totals by Race, 1790 to
1990, and by Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 1990, for the United States, Regions, Divisions, and States 41 tbl.23
(U.S. Census Bureau, Working Paper No. 56, 2002).
137. See Sabrina Tavernise & Matthew Rosenberg, These Are the Rioters Who Stormed the Nation’s
Capitol, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/07/us/names-of-rioterscapitol.html?searchResultPosition=2 [https://perma.cc/2HNC-MLEK (dark archive)]; see also Michele
L. Norris, Opinion, Believe What You Saw. With All This Country’s White Grievance, It Was Inevitable,
WASH. POST (Jan. 7, 2021, 5:11 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/believe-what-yousaw-with-all-this-countrys-white-grievance-it-was-inevitable/2021/01/07/87f55c02-5127-11eb-b96e0e54447b23a1_story.html [https://perma.cc/UP7F-K38W (dark archive)].
138. See Luke Broadwater & Nicholas Fandos, “A Hit Man Sent Them.” Police at the Capitol Recount
the Horrors of Jan. 6 as the Inquiry Begins., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/
2021/07/27/us/jan-6-inquiry.html [https://perma.cc/QPG4-ADBA (dark archive)].
139. See Girardeau A. Spann, Race Ipsa Loquitur, 2018 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1025, 1046–49
[hereinafter Spann, Race Ipsa Loquitur]; cf. Bank of Am. v. Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1300–01 (2017)
(discussing injuries suffered by the city itself as result of bank lending practices that discriminated
against minorities in violation of the Fair Housing Act).

100 N.C. L. REV. 739 (2022)

2022]

RANDOM JUSTICE

761

Typically, the lenders who establish and apply those lending criteria are
not consciously engaged in intentional racial discrimination. But they often
have implicit biases that unconsciously skew the ways in which they define and
apply those loan criteria. The problem of implicit racial bias has now been well
documented using the Implicit Association Test.140 However, this indirect form
of subconscious discrimination does not satisfy the high level of formalism that
Feeney requires to establish intentional discrimination under Washington v.
Davis. The Washington v. Davis intentional discrimination test simply lacks the
capacity to recognize implicitly biased forms of discrimination because such
forms of discrimination are not the product of conscious intent.
Often, what intuitively seem like obvious forms of invidious racial
discrimination are not deemed intentional for Equal Protection purposes. The
1989 case of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.141 provides a striking example of this.
In Croson, the Court was confronted with a record showing that, during the
pertinent time period, only 0.67% of construction contracts in Richmond,
Virginia, went to nonwhite contractors.142 Even though the Richmond
population was fifty percent Black, and Richmond had been the former capital
of the Confederacy, Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the Court deemed that
evidence insufficient to determine whether there had been past racial
discrimination in the Richmond construction trades.143
An Indiana voter ID law was upheld by the Supreme Court in the 2008
Crawford v. Marion County Election Board144 decision as a valid means of reducing
in-person voter fraud.145 The problem is that Indiana was not able to identify
even a single case of in-person voter fraud to justify the law.146 Nevertheless,
the Indiana voter ID law became one of an array of voter-suppression laws that
are used primarily by Republican states to reduce voting by nonwhites, who
tend to vote for Democrats.147 Voter ID laws have such a discriminatory effect
because nonwhite voters are significantly less likely than White voters to
possess the sorts of IDs that those states have deemed adequate for voting.148

140. See Implicit Association Test: About Us, PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://implicit.harvard.
edu/implicit/takeatest.html [https://perma.cc/7Q4Q-CMLG]; see also MAHZARIN R. BANAJI &
ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT: HIDDEN BIASES OF GOOD PEOPLE 39–47, 105, 108–10
(2013); Girardeau A. Spann, Good Faith Discrimination, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 585, 626–29
(2015) [hereinafter Spann, Good Faith Discrimination].
141. 488 U.S. 469.
142. See id. at 479–80.
143. See id. at 479–80, 509–11.
144. 553 U.S. 181.
145. See id. at 191, 202–03; see also Klarman, supra note 11, at 184–87.
146. See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 194–95; Klarman, supra note 11, at 184.
147. See Klarman, supra note 11, at 45–66, 178–94.
148. See id. at 48–51, 184–87.
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The 2013 Supreme Court decision in Shelby County v. Holder149 invalidated
a key provision of the 1965 Voting Rights Act—a statute that had produced
dramatic increases in nonwhite voting rates.150 Despite the broad adoption of
laws like the Crawford ID law, which were motivated by the desire to
disenfranchise nonwhite voters in the name of preventing largely nonexistent
voter fraud, the Shelby County Court could not find adequate evidence of
continuing state efforts to suppress nonwhite voting.151 Although the invidious
motive to engage in racial discrimination may at times be obvious to all
reasonable observers, its salience can still be insufficient to count as racial
discrimination for constitutional purposes.
B.

Disparate Impact

The Supreme Court’s Washington v. Davis intentional discrimination test
has provided constitutional protection for massive amounts of racially disparate
impact in the allocation of societal resources. This has been made glaringly clear
by the COVID-19 pandemic. Racially correlated disparities in the social
determinates of health have left nonwhites much more susceptible than Whites
to COVID-19 infection and death. Those social determinates include racial
disparities in housing, living conditions, nutrition, pollution, general health,
access to healthcare, access to health insurance, dangerous working conditions,
income, wealth, debt, childcare, and education.152 COVID-19 death rates are
highest for Blacks and Indigenous peoples, followed by Pacific Islanders, Latinx
people, Asians, and Whites.153 In the United States, Blacks are almost three
times as likely to die from COVID-19 as Whites, and in Washington, D.C.,
Blacks die at a rate that is six times higher than the rate for Whites.154 In 2020,
seventy-five percent of the fatal COVID-19 victims in Washington, D.C., were
Black, even though Blacks now make up only forty-six percent of the city’s
population.155
I emphasize COVID-19 racial disparities because they have become so
stark and relevant during the current pandemic. However, similarly dramatic
racial disparities exist in the distribution of nearly all significant societal
149. 570 U.S. 529.
150. See id. at 573–76 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
151. See id. at 550–53, 556–57 (majority opinion); see also Klarman, supra note 11, at 179–84.
152. See Covid-19 Racial and Ethnic Health Disparities, CDC (Dec. 10, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/
coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/health-equity/racial-ethnic-disparities/index.html [https://perma.
cc/5B7Y-6BVB].
153. See Wei Li, Racial Disparities in Covid-19, SCI. NEWS HARV. U. (Oct. 24, 2020),
http://sitn.hms.harvard.edu/flash/2020/racial-disparities-in-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/64YE-E393].
154. Michael E. Miller, In D.C., Black Families Reel from the Pain of Hundreds Lost to Covid-19 and
Killings, WASH. POST (Dec. 30, 2020, 10:20 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/black-dccovid-killings-job-loss/2020/12/29/a06701be-40a6-11eb-8db8-395dedaaa036_story.html [https://perm
a.cc/RR4H-H2YB (dark archive)].
155. See id.
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resources. I have previously cited a plethora of racial disparity statistics related
to money, education, employment, health, housing, voting, and of course, the
criminal justice system.156
Among the most disheartening of the disparate impact statistics is the fact
that the median household income for Blacks is less than sixty percent of the
median household income for Whites, and the typical White household has
sixteen times the wealth of the typical Black household.157 Moreover, the racial
wealth gap is increasing rather than decreasing.158 Ironically, receiving a college
education actually exacerbates rather than ameliorates these racial wealth gaps.
That is because discriminatory lending practices give Black students higher
tuition debt than White students, and the discriminatory job market often fails
to transform higher education into higher income for Black workers.159
Historically, Black unemployment rates have typically been twice the
unemployment rates for Whites.160 These discrepancies are largely attributable
to employment discrimination and not educational differences.161
Black infants are more than twice as likely to die as White infants, and
Black women are three to four times as likely to die from pregnancy-related
causes than White women.162 Although the widely recognized disproportionate
mortality rates for Black babies are cut in half if Black babies are cared for by
Black doctors, there are too few Black doctors to provide care for all Black
babies.163 Our anti-immigration policies cause even legal immigrants from Latin
America to forgo public health services, and Latinx people are more than three
times as likely to lack health insurance as Whites.164 Moreover, Blacks who want
to rent an apartment are told about 11.4% fewer units and shown 4.2 fewer units
than White renters, and Black homebuyers are informed of 17% fewer homes
and shown 17.7 fewer homes than White homebuyers.165 In some areas, 40% of
housing units were owned by Blacks, while White homeownership rates were
higher than 70%.166
156. See Spann, Race Ipsa Loquitur, supra note 139, at 1025–56.
157. See id. at 1036–37.
158. See id.
159. See Dorothy A. Brown, College Isn’t the Solution for the Racial Wealth Gap. It’s Part of the
Problem., WASH. POST (Apr. 9, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/04/09/studentloans-black-wealth-gap/ [https://perma.cc/V7HF-GLG6 (dark archive)].
160. See Spann, Race Ipsa Loquitur, supra note 139, at 1043.
161. See id.
162. See id. at 1044–45.
163. See Tonya Russell, Mortality Rate for Black Babies Is Cut Dramatically When Black Doctors Care
for Them After Birth, Researchers Say, WASH. POST (Jan. 13, 2021, 3:47 PM), https://www.washington
post.com/health/black-baby-death-rate-cut-by-black-doctors/2021/01/08/e9f0f850-238a-11eb-952e0c475972cfc0_story.html [https://perma.cc/5CS9-SYDX (dark archive)].
164. See Spann, Race Ipsa Loquitur, supra note 139, at 1045.
165. See id. at 1046–47.
166. See id.
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The racial disparities that characterize the criminal justice system were
called to the nation’s attention in the Ferguson Report that the U.S.
Department of Justice issued after the 2014 police shooting of a Black man
named Michael Brown by White police officer Darren Wilson.167 It showed that
from 2012 to 2014, Blacks constituted 67% of the Ferguson, Missouri,
population, but comprised 85% of the vehicles stopped, 90% of the citations
issued, and 93% of the arrests.168 Blacks were twice as likely as Whites to be
searched during vehicle stops, even though Blacks were 26% less likely than
Whites to possess contraband when stopped.169
Nationally, Black men are 6.7 times more likely to be incarcerated than
White men.170 And Blacks are 2.5 times more likely than Whites to be killed by
the police.171 Moreover, young Black men are twenty-one times more likely to
be killed by the police than young White men.172 And, of course, prosecutors
rarely charge or obtain convictions of police officers who shoot and kill unarmed
Blacks. That could be because, in recent years, fewer than 5% of chief
prosecutors in the United States were Black.173 In McCleskey v. Kemp,174 the
Supreme Court itself ignored the racially disparate impact of Georgia’s death
penalty statute and permitted the execution of a Black man even though
statistics showed that Black defendants were four times more likely to receive
the death penalty if their victims were White than if their victims were Black.175
Those statistics represent just a small sample of the many ways in which
our cultural practices have had a racially disparate adverse impact on nonwhites
and a racially disparate beneficial impact on Whites.176 Indeed, the ubiquity of
racially disparate impact has recently prompted some state legislatures to
propose—and Maine actually to enact—legislation requiring racial impact
statements that assess the racial consequences of pending legislation.177
167. See generally C.R. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE
DEPARTMENT (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015
/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/82B4-UMWK] (detailing findings
of a pattern or practice of unlawful conduct within the Ferguson Police Department).
168. See Spann, Race Ipsa Loquitur, supra note 139, at 1053.
169. See id.
170. See id. at 1054.
171. See id.
172. See Young Black Men Are 21 Times as Likely as Their White Peers To Be Killed by Police, EQUAL
JUST. INITIATIVE (Oct. 20, 2014), https://eji.org/news/study-shows-young-black-men-21-times-morelikely-to-be-killed-by-police/ [https://perma.cc/5UJ3-NK8L].
173. See Spann, Race Ipsa Loquitur, supra note 139, at 1055.
174. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
175. See Spann, Race Ipsa Loquitur, supra note 139, at 1082 (discussing McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286–
87).
176. See generally id. (citing numerous other racially disparate impact statistics).
177. See Scott Thistle, Governor Signs Bill Requiring Reviews of All Legislation for Racial Impacts,
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Mar. 19, 2021), https://www.pressherald.com/2021/03/19/mills-signsinto-law-bill-requiring-racial-impact-statements-on-new-legislation/ [https://perma.cc/Q3BX-QR38].
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Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s decision in Washington v. Davis to adopt an
intentional discrimination standard rather than a discriminatory effects test for
equal protection purposes has permitted the culture’s preference for a racially
disparate allocation of societal resources to go largely unchecked. In fact, the
White privilege that the Supreme Court’s intentional discrimination standard
invites has even become a constitutionally protected feature of U.S. culture.
C.

Societal Discrimination

The racially disparate allocation of societal benefits is so firmly entrenched
in U.S. culture that the Supreme Court has given it a name. Justice Powell’s
controlling opinion in the 1978 Bakke decision referred to such pervasive
disparate impact as “societal discrimination.”178 Terming it “an amorphous
concept of injury that may be ageless in its reach into the past,” Justice Powell
announced that societal discrimination could not be constitutionally remedied
through direct race-conscious efforts.179 That was because targeting such
remedies to “persons perceived as members of relatively victimized groups at
the expense of other innocent individuals in the absence of judicial, legislative,
or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory violations” would be
unfair to those who were thereby disadvantaged.180 Accordingly, Bakke
invalidated a program adopted by the University of California at Davis
reserving up to sixteen seats in its incoming medical school class of 100 for
economically and educationally disadvantaged students—some of whom were
permitted to self-identify as nonwhite.181
To Justice Powell, race-conscious disparate impact remedies for the
societal discrimination that harmed nonwhites were unconstitutional because
they interfered with White privilege. They threatened the disproportionate
resource advantages that were being enjoyed by innocent Whites. And, of
course, the reason that the White recipients of this privilege were “innocent”
was that, under the Court’s recently adopted intentional discrimination
standard, the White recipients had done nothing wrong.182 True, they were the
beneficiaries of a cultural system that had been structured to favor Whites over
nonwhites in myriad ways. But the racially disparate impacts of that system did
not count as unlawfully discriminatory under Washington v. Davis and Feeney.
Justice Powell concluded:
Hence, the purpose of helping certain groups whom the faculty of the
Davis Medical School perceived as victims of “societal discrimination”
does not justify a classification that imposes disadvantages upon persons
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307–10 (1978).
See id. at 307.
See id. at 307–09.
See id. at 272–76.
See id. at 298.
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like respondent, who bear no responsibility for whatever harm the
beneficiaries of the special admissions program are thought to have
suffered. To hold otherwise would be to convert a remedy heretofore
reserved for violations of legal rights into a privilege that all institutions
throughout the Nation could grant at their pleasure to whatever groups
are perceived as victims of societal discrimination. That is a step we have
never approved.183
Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke was the controlling opinion for a badly
split Supreme Court, but the opinion was joined only by Justice Powell himself.
Nevertheless, Justice Powell’s opinion has since acquired a talismanic aura. It
has often been endorsed by other Justices and has now been adopted by a
majority of the Court.184 Perhaps most notably, Justice O’Connor endorsed
Justice Powell’s societal discrimination view in her 2003 majority opinion
upholding a University of Michigan Law School racial affirmative action plan
in Grutter v. Bollinger.185 And Chief Justice Roberts also invoked Justice Powell’s
societal discrimination view in his 2007 plurality opinion invalidating a plan to
combat racial resegregation in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School District No. 1.186
Apparently, any direct effort to challenge White privilege by reducing its
racially disparate impact would itself be an unconstitutional creation of
nonwhite privilege. As a result, the existing entitlement of Whites to a
disproportionate share of societal resources ends up being protected by the
Equal Protection Clause. The resource allocation advantage that Whites have
over nonwhites is thereby normalized by the Constitution itself and thus built
into our baseline understanding of the way that things should operate in
American society.
The reason that the Supreme Court is willing to turn a blind eye to societal
discrimination is that the Supreme Court is a racialist Court. “Racialism” is a
term that some critical race theorists have used to describe the view that racial
183. Id. at 310.
184. Powell’s position was initially articulated in Bakke, id. at 307–10, and reasserted by Justice
Powell in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 274–79 (1986) (plurality opinion). Led
by Justice O’Connor, that view has since been adopted by a majority of the full Supreme Court. See
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323–25, 330 (2003) (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307, as rejecting
interest in remedying societal discrimination and rejecting racial balancing as “patently
unconstitutional”); see also Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 612–14 (1990) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting) (rejecting societal discrimination), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S.
200 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494–96 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(same); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 647–53 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (same);
Wygant, 476 U.S. at 288 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (same). Most recently, Chief Justice Roberts
reiterated this view in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
732–33 (2007) (plurality opinion) (same).
185. See 539 U.S. 306, 323–25, 330 (2003).
186. 551 U.S. at 731–32.
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discrimination is isolated and atomistic, consisting only of particularized bad
acts that deviate from a behavioral norm of colorblind race neutrality. The
racialist Supreme Court, therefore, rejects the view that racial discrimination is
holistic, systemic and structural in nature.187 As a result, the Court’s racial
jurisprudence has evolved in a way that does not even recognize as problematic
the pervasive societal discrimination embodied in the routine racially disparate
impact that the Court insists the Constitution must protect, reinforce, and
facilitate.
III. RANDOM JUSTICE
Racial discrimination, in the form of racially disparate impact, is so deeply
embedded in U.S. culture that we have thus far been unable to eradicate it.
Logically, it makes sense to use the law of affirmative action to provide
compensatory and prospective racial balance remedies for the ongoing
discrimination that we have not otherwise been able to prevent. But the
Supreme Court has formulated a law of affirmative action that invalidates as
unconstitutional efforts to pursue racial balance in the allocation of societal
resources. Moreover, racial discrimination is now so pervasive throughout the
culture that the Supreme Court’s own affirmative action doctrine is itself
racially discriminatory in its knowing sacrifice of nonwhite interests in order to
advance the interests of Whites. However, the Court’s current doctrinal rules
do allow for lottery-based affirmative action plans that randomly allocate
resources, such as university seats, in a way that approximates the equitable
distribution of resources that would exist in a nondiscriminatory society. Such
a randomized pursuit of racial equality might threaten the prestige of our elite
educational institutions, but the ensuing racial justice benefits would outweigh
any concomitant loss of elite educational prestige.
A.

Affirmative Action

So-called racial affirmative action is not the pejorative practice of reverse
discrimination that its opponents claim it to be. Rather, as Lyndon Johnson
explained when he first coined the term, affirmative action is a technique
designed to reduce the myriad forms of continuing racial bias and inequality
that have managed to elude our antidiscrimination laws.188 Support for
affirmative action is, therefore, support for racial equality. Opposition to
187. See CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT, at
xxiv–xxvii (Kimberlé Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller & Kendall Thomas eds., 1995); see also
Girardeau A. Spann, Disparate Impact, 98 GEO. L.J. 1133, 1137 (2010).
188. See Middleton v. City of Flint, 92 F.3d 396, 404 n.6 (6th Cir. 1996) (discussing the evolution
of the term “affirmative action”); Nicholas Lemann, Taking Affirmative Action Apart, N.Y. TIMES (June
11, 1995), https://www.nytimes.com/1995/06/11/magazine/taking-affirmative-action-apart.html [https:
//perma.cc/Y8C5-S6LZ (dark archive)] (providing additional background on the history of the term).
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affirmative action is support for maintaining the racially disparate status quo.
One’s support for either of those two objectives tends to correlate with one’s
political ideology on the issue of race.
As I argued in Section I.A above, the Supreme Court is part of a political
branch of government. Therefore, it is not surprising that the degree of
Supreme Court support for affirmative action has varied over time. Outcomes
in particular cases have been determined by whether the Court’s liberal or
conservative voting blocs had political control of the Court when the Court
issued its decisions. In the 1970s and 1980s, the liberal bloc succeeded in
upholding at least some affirmative action plans.189 Since the 1990s, however,
the Court’s conservative bloc has invalidated most of the racial affirmative
action programs that it has considered, typically in five-to-four politically
correlated decisions.190 With the recent addition of Justice Barrett to the Court,
it seems likely that the Supreme Court’s future anti-affirmative action decisions
will be issued by a six-to-three Court.
There are doctrinal anomalies in the Supreme Court’s affirmative action
jurisprudence that I have tried to highlight here191 and have analyzed in greater
detail elsewhere.192 Perhaps most striking is the fact that the Court applies the
same standard of strict scrutiny to benign affirmative action plans that it applies
to invidious racial classifications. After years of Supreme Court vacillation
concerning the proper level of scrutiny, Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion in
Adarand Constructors v. Peña193 overruled the Court’s earlier decision in Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC.194 Her Adarand opinion held that typically fatal strict
189. See, e.g., Metro Broad, Inc., 497 U.S. at 556–58, 566 (upholding FCC license preference for
nonwhite broadcasters); Loc. 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 431–
33, 479–81 (1986) (upholding court-ordered union membership preference for nonwhite workers);
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 453–54, 492 (1980) (upholding construction contract set aside for
nonwhite contractors); United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 151–53,
168 (1977) (upholding redistricting preference for nonwhite voters); see also GIRARDEAU A. SPANN,
THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON
RACE AND REMEDIES 156–64 (2000) [hereinafter SPANN, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION] (describing
Supreme Court voting blocs, with a chart showing how Justices voted).
190. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 255–57, 275–76 (2003) (invalidating University of Michigan
undergraduate admissions affirmative action plan); Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 723, 730, 732, 740
(invalidating Seattle elementary and secondary school pupil assignment affirmative action plan); Fisher
v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2206, 2215 (2016) (upholding University of
Texas at Austin undergraduate affirmative action program for student admissions); see, e.g., Miller v.
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916–20, 927–28 (1995) (invalidating majority-minority voter redistricting plan);
see also SPANN, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note 189, at 156–64; cf. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327–30, 334
(upholding University of Michigan Law School affirmative action program for student admissions).
191. See supra Part II.
192. See, e.g., SPANN, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note 189, at 156–64; Spann, Race Ipsa Loquitur,
supra note 139, at 1039–40; Girardeau A. Spann, Good Trouble, U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE (Oct. 30,
2020), https://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu/2020/10/30/aa-spann/ [https://perma.cc/U86L-KTFW].
193. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
194. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
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scrutiny—rather than more permissive intermediate scrutiny—applied to all
racial classifications, whether benign or invidious.195 Responding to Justice
O’Connor’s insistence on applying the same level of scrutiny to both benign
and invidious discrimination, Justice Stevens’s Adarand dissent accused Justice
O’Connor of being unable to tell the difference between a no trespassing sign
and a welcome mat.196
Justice O’Connor defended her insistence on strict scrutiny by
emphasizing that the Equal Protection Clause protected White people as well
as nonwhites, thereby making strict scrutiny necessary to ensure that Whites
were not being discriminated against in order to benefit nonwhites.197 That, of
course, turned the Fourteenth Amendment on its head by ignoring the fact that
the original public meaning of the Equal Protection Clause was to guard against
the post-Civil War exploitation of Blacks for the benefit of Whites. The
pervasive racial disparities discussed in Section II.B continue to exist today,
thereby showing that our society has hardly passed through the looking glass
and become one in which Whites now need Supreme Court protection from
victimization by nonwhites.
Despite the Fifteenth Amendment prohibition on discrimination in
voting, the United States has had a long history of disenfranchising nonwhite
voters. Congress took remedial affirmative action to address this voter
discrimination by passing the Voting Rights Act of 1965.198 The Act was
successfully able to increase nonwhite voting rates, especially in the South.199
Nevertheless, in its 2013 Shelby County v. Holder decision, the Supreme Court
effectively nullified the Section 5 federal preclearance provision of the Act that
had made it so successful.200 It did so by invalidating the Section 4 provision of
the Act that determined which jurisdictions were covered, meaning that no
jurisdiction was subject to Section 5 preclearance any longer.201
Prior to the invalidation of Section 4, the Voting Rights Act had been
successful by prompting the creation of majority-minority voting districts.
Because a majority of voters in such districts were nonwhite, nonwhite voters
had a better chance of electing candidates of their choice.202 But in 1993, the
195. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 223–27 (overruling Metro Broad., Inc., 497 U.S. at 566).
196. See id. at 245 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The consistency that the Court espouses would
disregard the difference between a ‘No Trespassing’ sign and a welcome mat.”).
197. See id. at 223–26, 230 (majority opinion).
198. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C.
§§ 10101, 10301–10314, 10501–10508, 10701–10702).
199. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 536–40 (2013) (outlining the history of the
Voting Rights Act and congressional reauthorizations); id. at 559, 564–66, 593–94 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (outlining the same).
200. See id. at 550–57 (invalidating Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965).
201. See id. at 557.
202. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 639–52 (1993).
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Court’s decision in Shaw v. Reno203 held that White voters had standing to
challenge such districts as entailing a form of racial discrimination, even though
those districts had enabled the first Black representatives to be sent to Congress
since Reconstruction.204 Then, in 1995, Miller v. Johnson205 went on to hold that
the Equal Protection Clause invalidated majority-minority districts if race had
been the predominate factor in drawing district lines.206
The Court’s decisions in Shelby County, Shaw, and Miller made it easier for
White voters to preserve and perpetuate the electoral advantages that they have
historically had over nonwhite voters. Then, the Supreme Court went on to
help Whites also use the voter initiative process to maintain their advantages
over nonwhites in the distribution of resources.
In its 2014 Schuette v. Coalition To Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and
Immigrant Rights and Fight for Equality by Any Means Necessary (BAMN)207
decision, the Court chose to perpetuate existing racial inequalities by upholding
a Michigan voter initiative that amended the state constitution to prohibit
affirmative action.208 At first blush, upholding a requirement for prospective
colorblindness in the allocation of resources might seem unobjectionable.209 But
since Adarand, the Supreme Court now permits the use of racial affirmative
action only when it satisfies the exacting demands of strict scrutiny—meaning
it has to be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling government interest.210
As a result, the Schuette decision means that Michigan voters were allowed to
ban the use of racial affirmative action even when affirmative action was
necessary to satisfy the government’s compelling interest in remedying past
discrimination or providing for prospective diversity.
In Adarand, Justice O’Connor stated that strict scrutiny was not
necessarily fatal scrutiny.211 However, many were skeptical because no invidious
racial classification had survived strict scrutiny since Korematsu, and the Court’s
Korematsu decision to uphold the World War II Japanese-American exclusion
order under strict scrutiny had itself become widely condemned.212

203. Id. at 630.
204. See id. at 659 (White, J., dissenting) (noting that majority-minority district resulted in North
Carolina sending its first Black representative to Congress since Reconstruction); id. at 676 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) (noting the same).
205. 515 U.S. 900.
206. See id. at 916–20, 927–28.
207. 572 U.S. 291.
208. See id. at 313–14.
209. See id. at 331–32 (Scalia, J., concurring).
210. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
211. See id. at 237 (“Finally, we wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is ‘strict in theory, but
fatal in fact.’” (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring))).
212. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) (“Korematsu was gravely wrong the day it
was decided, has been overruled in the court of history, and—to be clear—‘has no place in law under
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Nevertheless, in the 2003 case of Grutter v. Bollinger, the Supreme Court
surprisingly upheld the University of Michigan Law School’s affirmative action
program.213 Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion held that the program survived
strict scrutiny because it was a narrowly tailored effort to advance the school’s
compelling interest in achieving a racially diverse student body.214 But the
reliability of the Grutter decision as a basis for predicting the fate of other
affirmative action plans was called into question by the Court’s decision
invalidating the University of Michigan undergraduate affirmative action
program on the same day that Grutter was decided.
In Gratz v. Bollinger,215 the Court held that the undergraduate plan was
unconstitutional because it was not narrowly tailored.216 However, the problem
is that both the law school and undergraduate plans seem legally
indistinguishable with respect to the doctrinal standards governing strict
scrutiny. Therefore, it appears as if the Gratz Court was merely disagreeing
with the judgment of the undergraduate college about how much weight racial
diversity should be given in pursuit of a school’s educational mission.217 The
Court supplanted the school’s judgment even though Grutter had emphasized
that the Court should show deference to educational institutions on this issue,
in light of their greater relative expertise.218
Justice O’Connor’s Grutter decision to uphold a racial affirmative action
plan was so distasteful to the other Justices in the Court’s conservative voting
bloc that, when Justice Alito replaced Justice O’Connor on the Supreme Court
in 2006, opponents of affirmative action hoped that the Court would overrule
Grutter when an appropriate case presented itself.219 The 2013 case of Fisher v.
the Constitution.’” (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 248 (1944) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting))).
213. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003).
214. See id.
215. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
216. Compare Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327–30, 334 (upholding University of Michigan Law School
affirmative action program for student admissions), with Gratz, 539 U.S. at 255–57, 275–76
(invalidating an arguably indistinguishable University of Michigan undergraduate affirmative action
program on same day that Grutter was decided).
217. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 279–80 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (holding that the undergraduate
program must have individualized consideration); see also Spann, Good Faith Discrimination, supra note
140, at 601–02.
218. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328–29.
219. Cf. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2215 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that Grutter should
be overruled). Justice Thomas stated:
I write separately to reaffirm that “a State’s use of race in higher education admissions
decisions is categorically prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause.” “The Constitution
abhors classifications based on race because every time the government places citizens on racial
registers and makes race relevant to the provision of burdens or benefits, it demeans us all.”
That constitutional imperative does not change in the face of a “faddish theor[y]” that racial
discrimination may produce “educational benefits.” The Court was wrong to hold otherwise
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University of Texas at Austin (Fisher I)220 provided the Court with such an
opportunity. But Justice Kennedy—who had dissented from the Court’s
decision in Grutter—instead provided a fifth vote to remand the case for more
stringent application of the narrow-tailoring prong of the strict scrutiny test.221
After remand, when the Court heard the case again in 2016 (Fisher II),
Justice Kennedy wrote a five-to-four majority opinion upholding the University
of Texas affirmative action plan, which had been modeled on the plan upheld
in Grutter.222 However, now that Justice Kavanaugh has replaced Justice
Kennedy on the Court, and Justice Barrett has replaced Justice Ginsburg, the
current six-to-three conservative majority on the Supreme Court may well
overrule Grutter or so narrow its applicability that it loses any meaningful
precedential value for upholding future racial affirmative action.223
Although Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Grutter upheld the University of
Michigan Law School affirmative action plan, it also forcefully reaffirmed the
assertion first articulated by Justice Powell in Bakke, that efforts to achieve racial
balance in the distribution of resources would be “patently unconstitutional.”224
That statement has been reasserted in numerous other Supreme Court opinions,
including Fisher I, Parents Involved, and Fisher II.225 If this Article is correct in
its conclusion that racial equality cannot be achieved without first securing
racial balance in the distribution of societal resources, the Supreme Court’s
affirmative action doctrine simply precludes the possibility of achieving racial
equality.
Consistent with this view, Parents Involved invalidated a race-conscious
student assignment program that was adopted to reduce the resegregation
occurring in public schools as a result of population shifts that increased de facto
residential segregation.226 Bizarrely, Chief Justice Roberts actually invoked
Brown v. Board of Education in support of his decision to protect school

in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 156 L.Ed.2d 304 (2003). I would
overrule Grutter and reverse the Fifth Circuit’s judgment.
Id. (citations omitted).
220. 570 U.S. 297.
221. See id. at 303, 311–15.
222. See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2206, 2215.
223. See Ellie Gardey, The Looming End to Affirmative Action, AM. SPECTATOR (Dec. 12, 2020,
12:05 AM), https://spectator.org/affirmative-action-scotus/ [https://perma.cc/Z6UD-PNPK (dark
archive)].
224. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329–30 (2003).
225. See, e.g., Fisher I, 570 U.S. at 311; Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.
1, 551 U.S. 701, 723 (2007); Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2225–26; see also Spann, Race Ipsa Loquitur, supra
note 139, at 1083–84 (citing additional cases).
226. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 733–35 (plurality opinion) (stating that the resegregation
plan did not advance a compelling interest in diversity and was not narrowly tailored).
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resegregation.227 The Court further reinforced its inclination to protect existing
racially disparate impact in Ricci v. DeStefano,228 where it threatened to hold
unconstitutional Title VII’s statutory prohibition on racially disparate impact
in employment discrimination.229 The Court imposed a saving construction on
the statute in order to avoid applying its disparate impact standard.230 But in
his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia suggested that he already viewed the
statutory disparate impact standard as unconstitutional because it did not
survive the Washington v. Davis and Feeney intentional discrimination test.231
The Court’s threat to invalidate disparate impact statutes is given
increased plausibility by the Court’s 2013 Shelby County decision, which
invalidated the statistically based provision of the Voting Rights Act that was
needed to enforce the Act’s preclearance requirement for jurisdictions with a
racially disparate history of suppressing nonwhite voting.232 It is true that the
Court’s 2015 decision in Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v.
Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.233 rejected a challenge to the disparate impact
provision of the Fair Housing Act of 1968—albeit with a Ricci-inspired
stringent causation requirement that limits the application of the disparate
impact standard.234 However, the five-to-four majority in that case included
Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg, both of whom are no longer on the Court.235 It
is questionable whether the Supreme Court’s tolerance of disparate impact will
survive the Court’s present six-to-three conservative majority.
In addition to the many impediments that the Supreme Court’s
affirmative action rules have erected to prevent a more racially equitable
reallocation of societal resources, Professor Dan Farber has emphasized that the
Supreme Court’s law of affirmative action is itself racially discriminatory.236 For
example, when government action—such as the police officer verbal skills test
administered in Washington v. Davis—has a known racially disparate impact, the
adverse effect on nonwhites does not count as intentional discrimination.237
227. See id. at 743; cf. id. at 798–99 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting “cruel irony” in Chief Justice
Roberts’ invocation of Brown to compel resegregation).
228. 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
229. See id. at 563, 582–93.
230. See id. at 582–93.
231. See id. at 594–96 (Scalia, J., concurring).
232. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 550–57 (invalidating Section 4 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965).
233. 135 S. Ct. 2507.
234. See id. at 2523–25.
235. Id. at 2512.
236. See DANIEL A. FARBER, WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & JANE S.
SCHACTER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THEMES FOR THE
CONSTITUTION’S THIRD CENTURY 354–58 (5th ed. 2013) (describing a racially correlated
discrepancy in the Supreme Court’s treatment of racial discrimination claims).
237. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 232–37 (1976).
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That is because the government does not have the “because of” intent to harm
nonwhites that is required by Feeney. However, when government action—such
as the set asides for socially and economically disadvantaged nonwhite
construction contractors in Adarand—has a known racially disparate impact, the
adverse effect on Whites does count as intentional discrimination.238 That is
true even though the government was not motivated by a desire to harm
Whites, but only to help disadvantaged nonwhite contractors “in spite of” the
adverse impact on Whites that should be permitted by Feeney. Accordingly,
disparate impact counts as unconstitutional racial discrimination when Whites
are disadvantaged, but not when nonwhites are disadvantaged.239 Stated
differently, maintaining or exacerbating current racial disparities in the
allocation of societal resources is not unconstitutional. But trying to remedy
current racial disparities in the allocation of societal resources is.240
I have tried to demonstrate that the Supreme Court, whose Justices are
selected and confirmed in large part because of their political and ideological
beliefs, has developed a law of affirmative action that is striking in its preference
for the interests of Whites over the interests of nonwhites. The Court has held
that the Equal Protection Clause of the Reconstruction Fourteenth
Amendment protects the interests of the White majority when they conflict
with the interests of nonwhite minorities.241 It has held that the same typicallyfatal strict scrutiny standard of review that governs invidious discrimination
also applies to benign affirmative action.242 It has held that the Constitution
does not permit race-conscious remedies for general societal discrimination.243
It has held that Brown v. Board of Education protects the de facto resegregation
of public schools, even when school districts wish to use race-conscious pupil
assignment to prevent that resegregation.244 It has held that disparate impact
does not count as a form of unconstitutional racial discrimination.245 And it has

238. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 204 (1995).
239. See FARBER ET AL., supra note 236, at 357–58.
240. It is true that racial affirmative action programs tend to use facial race-based classifications,
and that such facial use of race is typically absent in other government actions that produce racially
disparate impacts. But it is not clear why that should matter when the facial use of race for affirmative
action purposes is not evidence of an invidious intent to harm Whites under Washington v. Davis and
Feeney. In addition, as illustrated by the majority-minority voting districts at issue in cases like Shaw
v. Reno and Miller v. Johnson, the Supreme Court sometimes invalidates racial affirmative action plans
designed to protect nonwhite voters even when the affirmative action plans are facially neutral. See
supra text accompanying notes 203–06.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 202–04.
242. See supra text accompanying notes 191–96.
243. See supra Section II.C.
244. See supra text accompanying note 227.
245. See supra Section II.A.
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held that the Constitution prohibits the pursuit of racial balance, which the
Court deems to be “patently unconstitutional.”246
The Supreme Court’s affirmative action doctrines leave little hope for
meaningful progress in the quest for racial equality. Rather, the Court seems
firmly committed to the protection, preservation, and perpetuation of the
White privilege that has always characterized U.S. culture. Nevertheless, there
may be a crack in the Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence that still allows
us to promote racial balance in the allocation of societal resources, if only we
have the will to do so.
B.

Equality by Chance

In a nondiscriminatory culture, the natural distribution of societal
resources would be racially proportional.247 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
has held that the direct pursuit of racial balance in the allocation of resources is
prohibited, ironically, by the Equal Protection Clause itself. However, if
resources such as university admissions were allocated randomly through a
lottery, we would end up with a racially proportional distribution of those
resources. Chance would do a better job than the Supreme Court has done in
neutralizing disparate impact. And even Justice Thomas believes that such a
strategy would be consistent with the Court’s existing affirmative action
doctrine.248 Nondiscriminatory standards could be used to ensure minimum
qualifications in a way that was consistent with our current conceptions of
merit. Although lottery-based admissions might threaten the prestige of elite
246. See supra text accompanying notes 224–25.
247. Some have suggested that racially proportional strategies for allocating educational resources
would provide a sensible way to address the current problem of racial discrimination in education. See,
e.g., John Charles Boger, Toward Ending Residential Segregation: A Fair Share Proposal for the Next
Generation, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1573, 1573–74 (1993) (proposing national “Fair Share” tax incentives to
eliminate residential segregation, based on statistical compliance with specified desegregation goals);
cf. Julius Chambers, John Charles Boger & William Tobin, How Colleges and Universities Can Promote
K-12 Diversity: A Modest Proposal, POVERTY & RACE, Jan.–Feb. 2008, at 1, 1–2, 11–13,
https://www.prrac.org/pdf/K12DiversityJanMar2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/X7FV-6ZSM] (proposing
“diversity capital” admissions plus accorded college and university applicants from racially and
economically disadvantaged secondary schools, which would facilitate desired levels of diversity in
higher education). In other contexts, I myself have suggested that the pursuit of racial proportionality
in the allocation of all significant societal resources offers the best hope of addressing the intractable
problem of longstanding and persistent racial discrimination in the United States. See, e.g., Spann, Race
Ipsa Loquitur, supra note 139, at 1086–87; Spann, Good Faith Discrimination, supra note 140, at 603–05;
SPANN, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note 189, at 92–94. In the post-Brown school desegregation case
of Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971), even Chief Justice Burger
suggested that the pursuit of racial balance through the use of “mathematical ratios” was “likely to be a
useful starting point in shaping a remedy to correct past constitutional violations.” Id. at 25. However,
as the text following this footnote indicates, the Supreme Court has since become particularly hostile
to the pursuit of equality through racial proportionality. The lottery-based strategy advanced in this
Article should, therefore, be viewed as only a second-best solution.
248. See infra text accompanying notes 273–74.
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universities, any loss of prestige would be easily offset by the ensuing benefits
of racial justice. Similarly, lottery-based affirmative action could be used to
remedy disparate impact in the distribution of other societal resources as well.
Because U.S. culture has internalized a baseline assumption of White privilege,
we are unlikely to make meaningful strides toward racial equality in the absence
of some sort of precommitment that precludes us from succumbing to our
ubiquitous structural practices and implicit biases. But the adoption of
randomized affirmative action might constitute such a precommitment; it
would bind us to an understanding of racial justice that encompasses the
resource distribution that would exist in a truly nondiscriminatory culture.
Imagine a university that used lottery-based admissions as an affirmative
action plan to promote diversity in its student body.249 Statistically, the makeup
of the ensuing class would reflect the racial composition of the applicant pool.
If the university chose to minimize barriers to entry that were racially
correlated—such as geographic limitations, religious restrictions, or high
application fees—the composition of the applicant pool would reflect the racial
composition of the larger pertinent population as well. It is true that individual
applicant preferences, such as the desire to attend universities or the ability to
pay tuition, might be racially skewed. But those racial differences would likely
reflect differences in socialization, acculturation, or social and economic
inequalities that themselves reflect structural forms of racial discrimination or
implicit bias, rather than reflecting inherent racial differences. Universities
could decide how much they wish to correct for those factors in their efforts to
get their applicant pools to mirror the diversity that exists in the culture at large.
The goal would be to get a natural distribution of students that approximated
the racial diversity that would exist in a nondiscriminatory culture.
Educational experts have begun to consider lottery-based admissions as a
way of increasing student body diversity, but they note that without a true
commitment to diversity, many loopholes can be exploited to undermine the
success of lottery programs.250 Despite vigorous controversy, some high schools
have adopted randomized lottery admissions that increase student diversity and
reduce the racially disparate impact of traditional racially correlated admissions
criteria. For example, prestigious Lowell High School in San Francisco
responded to COVID-19 standardized testing difficulties by admitting its entire
2021–2022 class through a lottery.251 It has now made a version of lottery-based
249. The details of a lottery admissions system could vary, but for present purposes, I am more
interested in the lottery concept than the details of particular systems that might be adopted.
250. See Anya Kamenetz, What If Elite Colleges Switched to a Lottery for Admissions, NPR (Mar. 27,
2019, 7:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/03/27/705477877/what-if-elite-colleges-switched-to-alottery-for-admissions [https://perma.cc/Y7VL-XY9L (dark archive)].
251. See David K. Li, Prominent San Francisco High School Could Drop Academic Achievement for
Admissions, NBC NEWS (Feb. 2, 2021, 9:43 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asianamerica/prominent-san-francisco-high-school-could-drop-academic-achievement-admission-n1256488
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admissions permanent as a means of increasing student body diversity.252 Not
surprisingly, the school’s permanent lottery proposal has been opposed by many
of those who benefit from the traditional exam-based admissions process; they
argue that the school’s prestige will be reduced by lottery admissions.253 Others
argue that deviation from standardized admissions exams discriminates against
Asian Americans who perform well on such exams.254
In December 2020, New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio announced a
compromise plan to increase diversity in the city’s selective high schools and
middle schools. The plan retains entrance exams for the city’s prestigious high
schools but uses lottery-based admissions for the city’s selective middle
schools.255 Throughout the nation, some private charter schools in the United
States also use weighted lotteries to increase student diversity.256
The country’s most highly ranked public high school is often said to be
Thomas Jefferson High School in Fairfax, Virginia.257 To increase diversity, the
school initially proposed lottery-based admissions in 2020, but the school
eventually bowed to pressure from parents and students who wished to retain

[https://perma.cc/748K-XRL3 (dark archive)]; see also Jay Mathews, Why Not Lottery Admissions for
Great High Schools? It’s Not Church Bingo, WASH. POST (Jan. 16, 2022, 6:00 AM), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/education/2022/01/16/selective-high-school-lottery/ [https://perma.cc/F8PF-US
86 (dark archive)] (discussing lottery-based efforts to increase student diversity at Lowell High School
in San Francisco, California, and Thomas Jefferson High School in Fairfax County, Virginia).
252. See Laura Meckler, Discord in San Francisco Schools, on Race and Reopening, Looms Large, WASH.
POST (May 22, 2021, 4:40 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2021/05/22/sanfrancisco-school-board-race-reopening/ [https://perma.cc/TJ3J-PJNW (dark archive)].
253. See id.; Jill Tucker, ‘Doesn’t Feel Fair’: Proposed Lottery Admissions for S.F.’s Elite Lowell High
School Met with Frustration and Anger, S.F. CHRON. (Oct. 14, 2020, 9:21 AM), https://www.
sfchronicle.com/education/article/Doesn-t-feel-fair-Proposed-lottery-15641937.php [https://perma.cc/
8KA4-DFTC (dark archive)].
254. See Hannah Natanson, Fairfax County School System Faces Second Lawsuit over Changes to
Thomas Jefferson Admissions, WASH. POST (Mar. 10, 2021, 6:10 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
local/education/thomas-jefferson-high-lawsuit-admissions-changes/2021/03/10/339e7c3c-81c0-11eb81db-b02f0398f49a_story.html [https://perma.cc/JE82-QAT4 (dark archive)] [hereinafter Natanson,
Fairfax County].
255. See Laura Meckler & Hannah Natanson, Schools, Caught by Pandemic and Confronting Systemic
Racism, Jettison Testing for Admissions, WASH. POST (Dec. 18, 2020, 7:11 PM), https://www.washington
post.com/education/nyc-schools-admissions-change-segregation/2020/12/18/6dd18590-4163-11eb8db8-395dedaaa036_story.html [https://perma.cc/6QBJ-NQRM (dark archive)]; see also Eliza Shapiro,
Lawsuit Challenging N.Y.C. School Segregation Targets Gifted Programs, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/09/nyregion/nyc-schools-segregation-lawsuit.html [https://perma.
cc/7TSB-3C3T (dark archive)].
256. See NAT’L ALL. FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHS., STATE LAWS ON WEIGHTED LOTTERIES AND
ENROLLMENT PRACTICES 4 (2015), http://www.publiccharters.org/sites/default/files/migrated/wpcontent/uploads/2015/06/NPC035_WeightedLotteries_Digital_rev.pdf [https://perma.cc/5JU3-G8J
H].
257. See, e.g., Best High Schools Rankings, U.S. NEWS, https://www.usnews.com/education/besthigh-schools/rankings-overview [https://perma.cc/U7G2-AXMQ (staff-uploaded archive)].
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the traditional exam-based admissions process from which they benefitted.258
The school ultimately chose a compromise designed to increase diversity by
admitting a certain percentage of students from each middle school in the region
rather than admitting students solely based on test scores.259
Although lottery-based university admissions are not common in the
United States, lotteries are sometimes used to admit university students in
European countries. In addition, some knowledgeable people have now
advocated for lottery-based university admissions in the United States as
well.260 Relatedly, many schools are now making optional, or entirely
eliminating, standardized university admission tests, such as the SAT and the
ACT.261 And the College Board has modified the format of its SAT exam.262
Lotteries could also be useful in implementing current calls to improve equity
and diversity by dramatically increasing the number of students admitted to
selective universities.263 Although lottery-based admissions are likely to remain
258. See Hannah Natanson, Fairfax School Board Switches to ‘Holistic Review’ Admissions System for
Thomas Jefferson High School, WASH. POST (Dec. 18, 2020, 12:20 PM), https://www.washington
post.com/local/education/thomas-jefferson-high-admissions-fairfax/2020/12/18/d09a2b3c-40b9-11eb8bc0-ae155bee4aff_story.html [https://perma.cc/JE82-QAT4 (dark archive)].
259. See id.; see also Natanson, Fairfax County, supra note 254.
260. See, e.g., Alia Wong, Lotteries May Be the Fairest Way To Fix Elite-College Admissions, ATLANTIC
(Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2018/08/lottery-college-admissions/
566492/ [https://perma.cc/4WKJ-FGCY (dark archive)]; Barry Schwartz, Do College Admissions by
Lottery, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2015, 4:42 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/03/31/
how-to-improve-the-college-admissions-process/do-college-admissions-by-lottery [https://perma.cc/R
A5W-3KKF (dark archive)]; Paul Fain, Call for Lottery-Style College Admissions, INSIDE HIGHER ED
(Apr. 7, 2020), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/04/07/call-lottery-style-college-admissions
[https://perma.cc/EKF5-7URM]; NEW AM., SUPPORTING STUDENTS OF COLOR IN HIGHER
EDUCATION 6–7 (2019), https://s3.amazonaws.com/newamericadotorg/documents/Supporting_
Students_of_Color_in_Higher_Education_New_America.pdf [https://perma.cc/U5VD-GLDD].
261. Nick Anderson, Applications Surge After Big-Name Colleges Halt SAT and ACT Testing Rules,
WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2021, 4:28 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/harvarduva-sat-act-requirement-college-applications/2021/01/29/90566562-6176-11eb-9430-e7c77b5b0297_
story.html [https://perma.cc/GPT4-SLEN (dark archive)]; cf. Valerie Strauss, More States Seek Federal
Waivers from Standardized Tests as Biden’s Education Department Extends Deadline for Requests, WASH.
POST (Jan. 29, 2021, 6:30 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2021/01/29/standa
rdized-tests-waiver-states-biden/ [https://perma.cc/F5W3-8G2L (dark archive)].
262. See Nick Anderson, College Board Is Scrapping SAT’s Optional Essay and Subject Tests, WASH.
POST (Jan. 19, 2021, 2:10 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/sat-ending-essaysubject-tests/2021/01/19/ac82cdd8-574a-11eb-a817-e5e7f8a406d6_story.html [https://perma.cc/57QUKYVU (dark archive)] (noting how the SAT is changing by eliminating its optional essay and
supplementary subject tests in various fields).
263. See Brandon Busteed, Elite Universities Should Enroll a Million Students, FORBES (Feb. 20,
2021, 6:55 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/brandonbusteed/2021/02/20/elite-universities-shouldenroll-a-million-students/?sh=48061e764ba7 [https://perma.cc/VD5Z-T83R]; Jay Mathews, Showing
Stingy Ivies How To Become Less Selective but Much Better, WASH. POST (Feb. 13, 2021, 6:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/ivy-league-admissions-low/2021/02/12/872c26226bb0-11eb-9ead-673168d5b874_story.html [https://perma.cc/G8NT-4WEN (dark archive)]; Jeffrey J.
Selingo, Harvard and Its Peers Should Be Embarrassed About How Few Students They Educate, WASH.
POST (Apr. 8, 2021, 1:19 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/harvard-and-its-peers-
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controversial in the immediate future, they do seem to offer an appealing
strategy for those who believe in the importance of reducing the racially
disparate impact of current admissions standards in a way that satisfies the
doctrinal constraints that the present Supreme Court has imposed on valid
affirmative action programs.
Because the stated goal of a lottery-based admissions program would be to
increase racial diversity, one might well wonder whether such an affirmative
action plan would constitute intentional discrimination that was
unconstitutional under Washington v. Davis and Feeney.264 Under existing law,
the plan would almost certainly be valid. It would be facially neutral by not
using the express racial classifications that are contained in some other
affirmative action plans.265 In addition, the goal of enhancing the educational
experience of both White and nonwhite students through a more diverse
student body seems more like a permissible goal under Feeney than a prohibited
racial classification under Washington v. Davis. If the D.C. Police Department
can use an exam to enhance the verbal skills of its police force despite the
resulting increase in racial disparities, a university should certainly be able to
use a randomized lottery to enhance the educational experience of its student
body, despite the resulting decrease in racial disparities. The effect of a lottery
on racial disparities seems more like permissible “in spite of” intent, rather than
invidious “because of” intent, under Feeney.266
Even if the university’s random lottery-based admissions plan were
somehow deemed to be a racial classification that was subject to strict scrutiny,
Supreme Court decisions ranging from Grutter to Fisher II have held that the
pursuit of diversity in the context of higher education is a compelling interest
sufficient to satisfy the strict scrutiny standard.267 And it is hard to think of a
more narrowly tailored strategy for enhancing diversity than one that relies on
race-neutral randomness rather than on any student’s race. It is true that the
new six-to-three conservative majority on the Supreme Court could
theoretically overrule Grutter and Fisher, holding that the pursuit of educational
diversity was no longer to be deemed a compelling governmental interest under
strict scrutiny analysis. But it would be hard to view such a holding as
legitimate. The Court would be ruling that White applicants have a
constitutional entitlement to the preferential treatment they are accorded under
should-be-embarrassed-about-how-few-students-they-educate/2021/04/08/3c0be99c-97cb-11eb-b28dbfa7bb5cb2a5_story.html [https://perma.cc/VC55-RK2S (dark archive)].
264. See supra Section II.A (discussing Washington v. Davis and Feeney).
265. For example, the undergraduate affirmative action program that the Court invalidated in
Gratz gave an explicit admissions preference to “underrepresented minorities,” and it considered
African Americans, Hispanics and Native Americans to fit within that category. See Gratz v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 244, 253–54 (2003).
266. See supra text accompanying notes 123–27.
267. See supra text accompanying notes 211–21.
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existing racially disparate admissions criteria and that their entitlement is
sufficient to defeat the racially neutral treatment they would be accorded by
randomized admissions. The Court would, in essence, be requiring affirmative
action for White applicants even though the remedial and diversity goals of
affirmative action would be defeated rather than advanced.
In its Fisher decisions, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality
of an express racial affirmative action plan that was modeled on the plan the
Court had previously upheld in Grutter.268 One of the constitutional challenges
to the Fisher plan was that it had been rendered unnecessary because Texas had
already adopted a Top Ten Percent Plan, under which any student graduating
in the top ten percent of his or her high school class was automatically granted
admission to the state’s flagship University of Texas at Austin.269 In evaluating
and ultimately upholding the plan, the Supreme Court assumed that the Top
Ten Percent Plan was racially neutral, even though the clear intent of the
legislature in adopting the plan was to promote racial diversity in the state’s
flagship school.270 Indeed, the constitutionality of the Top Ten Percent Plan
was not even challenged by the White plaintiff.271
If the Fisher Top Ten Percent Plan was not motivated by intentional
discrimination within the meaning of Washington v. Davis and Feeney, it would
be hard to conclude that a randomized lottery admissions plan, designed to
advance the very same diversity interest, was unconstitutionally motivated.
Moreover, if randomized lottery-based admissions were unconstitutional under
Washington v. Davis and Feeney, then it appears that there would be no other
way to remedy the problem of racially disparate university admissions. And
that, of course, would make lottery-based admissions the least restrictive means
of promoting student diversity, thereby bolstering the plan’s claim to
constitutional validity even under strict scrutiny.272
Another reason that the Court is unlikely to invalidate randomized lotterybased admissions programs, despite their admitted goal of promoting racially
balanced student body diversity, is that such a strategy flows from ideas
suggested by Justice Thomas himself. Thomas is a staunch opponent of racial
affirmative action. However, one of the reasons he gave for rejecting affirmative
action in his Grutter opinion was that less restrictive alternatives were available
to achieve diversity without using racial classifications to advance what he

268. See supra text accompanying notes 220–25.
269. See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2206, 2208–09 (2016).
270. See id. at 2211–14.
271. See id.
272. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 223–27 (1995) (applying strict
scrutiny); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327–30 (2003) (same).
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termed the “aesthetics” of a diverse student body.273 He suggested replacing
racially correlated “selective” admissions standards with other admissions
criteria that did not have a racially disparate impact. One race neutral
alternative he proposed was open admissions. Another alternative he proposed
was abandoning reliance on racially correlated standardized tests. He
emphasized that a school’s desire to retain selective admissions advanced only
the school’s interest in maintaining its elite status as a prestigious educational
institution. But the interest in remaining an elite institution was not a
compelling governmental interest.274 If open admissions and abandoning the
SAT are constitutionally permissible strategies for pursuing racial diversity,
then certainly using randomized lottery-based admissions, which never mention
race at all, would be a constitutionally permissible strategy as well.
One might argue that lottery-based admissions would abandon the concept
of merit. But that is not true. Randomizing selection among applicants who
satisfy minimum standards for admission would redefine rather than abandon
the concept of merit. The suggestion that grades and standardized test scores
exhaust the many factors that comprise merit is too restrictive a view to have
much normative appeal. Imagine teaching a case like Brown v. Board of Education
or Roe v. Wade in a class consisting of only White male students who had high
grades and exam scores.275 A diversity of perspectives on complex and contested
societal issues is at least as important to a quality educational experience as the
GPAs and SAT scores of the students in the class. Grades and test scores merely
reflect normative judgments about what factors some people deem to be
significant. They do not define a neutral or natural baseline about what is
educationally important.
It is all too easy to find smart people to fill the seats in a classroom. What
is more difficult is finding students who will question and challenge
conventional understandings and norms about the ways in which competing
societal interests are presented, recognized, and balanced. What is even more
difficult is selecting students in a way that is not skewed by the conscious or
implicit biases of the people who do the selecting. Because it is difficult to
identify with confidence the optimal mixture of diverse perspectives in an
educational setting, a sensible default approach would be to rely on the mixture
contained in a student body that was racially balanced—the type of student
body that would exist in a culture that was truly nondiscriminatory—the type
of student body that would be produced by randomized lottery admissions.
273. Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 at 354–61, 367–71 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
274. See id. at 356; see also Spann, The Dark Side of Grutter, supra note 9, at 236–39 (discussing
Justice Thomas’s rejection of racially correlated efforts to maintain school’s elite status).
275. See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (ordering desegregation of public
schools); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding constitutional privacy right to abortion).
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Even those who continue to believe that grades and test scores should
alone determine university admissions must admit that we often allow other
factors to override that narrow conception of merit. Factors such as legacy
status, athletic prowess, and geographic residence often supersede grades and
test scores in university admissions. Moreover, those deviations from grades
and test scores themselves have a racially disparate impact, because they benefit
Whites significantly more than they benefit nonwhites.276 In addition,
California’s famous Proposition 209277 ban on race and gender affirmative action
continues to allow deviations from merit that are based on preferences related
to veteran status, athletics, disability, geography, age, artistic ability, lowincome status, and legacy status.278 If deviations from merit are permissible for
such a wide range of factors that benefit Whites, it is not clear why a similar
deviation should not also be permitted to reduce the racially disparate impact
of grades and standardized test scores in university admissions.
I suspect that many of those who oppose randomized lottery admission
efforts to increase racial diversity and reduce the racially disparate impact of
traditional admissions standards silently believe that Whites simply possess
more merit than nonwhites. To the extent that such a view is supported by
traditional measures of merit, it suggests that the ways in which merit is
typically measured and acquired are themselves products of the structural
discrimination and implicit biases that exist in our culture. That further
supports the strategy of addressing such discrimination by randomized
affirmative action efforts to reduce racially disparate impact. However, if
people nevertheless believe that such efforts are doomed to fail because
nonwhites inherently possess less capacity than Whites to acquire merit, that is
simply a contemporary form of White supremacy.
Although this Article has focused on lottery-based university admissions,
the technique of using randomized lotteries to select among qualified applicants
can also be used to reduce racially disparate impact in the allocation of other
societal goods and services. Accordingly, lotteries could be used to allocate
things like jobs and promotions, to award construction contracts, to grant
mortgages and other loans, and to decide who gets coronavirus vaccine shots.
276. See, e.g., David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Understanding Affirmative Action, 23 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 921, 965 (1996) (noting that more students are admitted to Harvard each year through
legacy preferences than through all racial affirmative action preferences combined); see also Grutter, 539
U.S. at 367–68 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that legacy preferences undermine meritocracy in
higher education admissions).
277. Proposition 209 was adopted in 1996 as a voter initiative to amend the California
Constitution. See CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 31(a); see also Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692,
696 (9th Cir. 1997) (discussing voter initiative and constitutional amendment).
278. See Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1498 n.19, 1499, 1505 (N.D. Cal.
1996) (enumerating types of affirmative action preferences that are untouched by Proposition 209),
vacated by 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997).
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Those resources, and many others, are currently distributed in ways that are
racially correlated. But randomized allocations would enlist the safeguard of
statistical chance as a filter to guard against the cultural forces that end up
producing that disparate impact.
University admissions based on randomized lotteries could advance the
goal of racial justice by reducing the racially disparate impact of our current
university admissions criteria. The benefits would be substantial, because the
most significant form of racial discrimination that exists in contemporary U.S.
culture is the arguably “unintentional” discrimination permitted by Washington
v. Davis and Feeney despite its disparate impact. Notwithstanding the goal of
promoting racial balance, randomized lottery admissions would be
constitutionally valid under the current Supreme Court’s law of affirmative
action. Lottery-based admissions would also help us overcome the tacit White
privilege that is built into our existing baseline assumptions about things like
merit. The only significant cost of using lottery-based admissions as an
affirmative action remedy for racially disparate impact would be a potential
reduction in the esteem and prestige presently possessed by our elite
universities. But that is a small price to pay for racial justice.279 The racial history
of the United States suggests that we are not likely to achieve racial equality if
left to our own devices. However, by invoking the antidiscrimination safeguard
of statistical chance, we may be able to precommit ourselves to achieving a
degree of equality that we could not otherwise attain.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court is best viewed as the head of a political branch of
government, whose Justices are chosen by a process that makes their ideological
views dispositive in their selection. The constitutional and other doctrinal rules
that the Court interprets are sufficiently ambiguous that resorting to the
political preferences of the Justices is necessary to give the doctrine operative
meaning. However, throughout its history, the political and ideological
preferences of the Supreme Court have been invoked in ways that favor the
interests of Whites over the interests of nonwhites, thereby making the Court
an instrumental player in the maintenance of White privilege.
Subtle forms of White privilege are so pervasively present in the
structures and institutions of our society that discrimination in favor of Whites
is able to elude formal detection by the legal rules that are supposed to prevent
it. As a result, the most promising strategy for pursuing racial equality is to
279. A loss of prestige and esteem might arguably entail some ensuing financial or economic loss
as well. But any such loss would not merit legitimate recognition. That is because the loss would be
occasioned only by a school’s curtailed ability to continue receiving the financial benefits that
previously flowed from engaging in racially discriminatory admissions.
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adopt affirmative action programs that are designed to remedy the dramatic
racially disparate impact that exists in the allocation of societal resources. But
the Supreme Court has held that efforts to promote such racial balance are
patently unconstitutional, because only a narrow conception of intentional
discrimination is recognized by the Constitution. The Court thereby accords
constitutional protection to the myriad forms of structural discrimination and
implicit bias that comprise the most common ways to practice contemporary
racial discrimination.
Nevertheless, there is a way that affirmative action can address the
problem of racially disparate impact within the confines of the Court’s existing
jurisprudence. In the context of university admissions, for example, diversity
could be enhanced by admitting qualified applicants under a randomized lottery
system. Statistical chance would, therefore, provide a safeguard against
structural discrimination and implicit bias. And the racial makeup of the student
body would approximate the racial makeup of the society at large—just as it
would in a racially nondiscriminatory culture.
Despite the admitted goal of promoting racial balance, lottery-based
admissions would be sufficiently race-neutral to survive scrutiny by even our
new six-to-three conservative Supreme Court under any legitimate
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause. Any ensuing loss of prestige for
elite universities would be a small price to pay for enhanced racial justice.
Lotteries could be used to allocate other societal resources as well. And a lotterybased system for allocating societal resources would constitute the sort of
binding precommitment to racial equality that seems necessary in a society
whose other efforts at achieving racial equality have been a failure since before
the nation’s founding. But it is a commitment that we will be willing to make
only if we genuinely believe in racial equality.
I do have one reservation in proposing randomized lottery-based strategies
for societal resource allocation. My proposal represents an effort to color within
the lines established by the Supreme Court’s existing doctrinal framework. The
danger in complying with, rather than defying, such a framework is that I am
actually legitimating the Court’s assertion of constitutional power over an
important issue of social policy. At least where race is involved, such social
policy issues should properly be resolved by other branches of government
whose histories of dealing with nonwhite interests are at least marginally less
hostile than the Supreme Court’s long history of protecting White privilege.
Perhaps, rather than trying to circumvent the Court’s prohibition on pursuing
racial balance to remedy racially disparate impact, it might make more sense to
challenge that prohibition head on. But, if so, that is a story for another day.

